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The Research Patent
Sean B. Seymore*
The patent system gives courts the discretion to tailor patentability
standards flexibly across technologies to provide optimal incentives for
innovation. For chemical inventions, the courts deem them unpatentable if the
chemical lacks a practical, non-research-baseduse at the time patentprotection
is sought. The fear is that an early-stagepatenton a researchinput would confer
too much control over yet-unknown uses for the chemical, thereby potentially
hindering downstream innovation. Yet, denying patents on research inputs can
frustrate patent law's broad goal of protecting and promoting scientific and

technological advances.
This Article addresses this problem by proposing a new form of
intellectualproperty--a "researchpatent." This regime would allow inventors
to obtain patents on research inputs and extract their full value through
licensing and enforcement. Research patents would impose minimal
administrative costs on the patent system and ultimately promote the
disclosure, development, and use of early-stage inventions. At a broader level,
the proposed regime raises the theoretical question of how allowing patent
protection on early-stage inventions like research inputs serves patent law's
instrumental justification of promoting scientific progress. It also raises
significant normative and policy questions about technology-specific
patentability standards and their role in furthering the goals of the
patent system.
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INTRODUCTION

Chemical inventions hold a special place in patent law. The first
patent granted in the United States was for an improved method for
making potash (potassium carbonate). 1 A comprehensive study of the
U.S. patent system shows that over two-thirds of the value of worldwide

patents accrues to chemical and pharmaceutical firms. 2 Indeed,
a blockbuster drug patent can generate billions of dollars in
annual revenue. 3
A fascinating aspect of chemical inventions is that their value
often stems from unpredictability: it is often hard to predict what a
chemical can do.4 Researchers must engage in trial and error to figure
out what works and what does not. 5 The inability to predict an outcome
sets the stage for big paradigm shifts and radical innovations. 6 So it
would seem that the patent system would encourage patenting
1.

The Making of Potash and Pearl Ashes, U.S. Patent No. X1 (issued July 31, 1790).

2.

JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE 109 (2008).
RONALD J. VOGEL, PHARMACEUTICAL ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 25 (2007).

3.

See, e.g., In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (holding that a vaccine's
4.
success combating one strain of a virus is not necessarily indicative of its success combating other
strains). Patent law considers inventions like electrical and mechanical devices "predictable"
because they involve well-understood, predictable functions. In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 496 (Fed.
Cir. 1991).
5.
See Sean B. Seymore, HeightenedEnablement in the UnpredictableArts, 56 UCLA L. REV.
127, 137-39 (2008) (discussing the need for experimentation with chemical inventions);
Cedarapids, Inc. v. Nordberg, Inc., No. 95-1529, 1997 WL 452801, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 11, 1997)
(explaining that in the chemical arts, "a slight variation ... can yield an unpredictable result or
may not work at all").

6.
Jane Calvert, What's Special About Basic Research?, 31 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 199,
204 (2006).
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chemical inventions. But interestingly enough, their unpredictable
nature can defeat patentability.
7
A basic tenet of patent law is that inventions must be useful.
The utility requirement is codified in § 101 of the patent statute, which
states in relevant part that "[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter . .. may
9
obtain a patent." 8 Commentators often describe utility as a "token" or
"nonexistent"10 patentability requirement.1 1 A better description is that
the utility threshold is technology-specific-de minimis for some
inventions but more stringent for others. For example, mechanical and
electrical inventions almost never face utility hurdles. 12 But the
opposite is true for chemical inventions, where the lack of a practical,
non-research-based use renders them unpatentable.13
Why are chemical inventions treated differently? One reason is
fear of the unknown. Consider a chemical compound, X. Predicting Xs
chemical reactivity or practical usefulness might be difficult-even if
the behavior of similar compounds is well understood. 14 This scenario
15
troubled the Supreme Court in the 1966 case Brenner v. Manson. It
16
hypothesized that upstream patents on early-stage research inputs
like X might create a "monopoly of knowledge" 17 that could "engross a

7.
Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (identifying utility as a part of the patent
bargain); Stiftung v. Renishaw PLC, 945 F.2d 1173, 1180 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("[Utility is] a
fundamental requirement of American patent law, dating back some two-hundred years .... ").

35 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added).
8.
9.
Kevin Emerson Collins, Patent Law's Authorship Screen, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1603,
1621 (2017).
10. Michael Risch, A Surprisingly Useful Requirement, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 57, 58 (2011).
11. Nathan Machin, Comment, Prospective Utility: A New Interpretation of the Utility
Requirement of Section 101 of the Patent Act, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 421, 436 (1999) ("[T]he utility
doctrine usually has been a low hurdle for patent applicants to clear.").
12. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Analyze This: A Law and Economics Agenda for the Patent
System, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2081, 2085 (2000) ("[T]he utility requirement has played little role in
evaluating the patentability of mechanical inventions .... "); JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW

492 (6th ed. 2020) ("Utility is rarely at issue for mechanical or electrical inventions.').
13. See infra Part I (discussing utility as a lever for patentability).
14. See, e.g., AstraZeneca Pharms. LP v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 583 F.3d 766, 775 (Fed.
Cir. 2009) ("[T]he properties of these structurally similar compounds [can] vary significantly with
minor structural changes.").

15. 383 U.S. 519 (1966).
16. "Upstream" patents "claim technologies associated with basic and early stage research
and development, as opposed to patents covering 'downstream' commercial products." Chris
Holman, Clearinga Path Through the Patent Thicket, 125 CELL 629, 629 (2006).
17. Manson, 383 U.S. at 534.
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vast, unknown, and perhaps unknowable area"18 and potentially "block

off whole areas of scientific development." 19
But this fear of monopolization and hindered innovation has
costs. For example, suppose the inventor of Xis an academic researcher
who wants to license it to a pharmaceutical firm interested in
developing X and finding uses for it. Revenue from a patent license
could pay for the research project-an important concern given the
competition for funding in academic science and the decline in federal
support for basic research. 20 Without a patent, the firm or a subsequent
researcher who learns about X21 could develop (and possibly patent)

profitable uses for it based directly on the inventor's earlier work
without having to provide any recognition 22 or compensation. 23
is
an
all-or-nothing
invention
a chemical
Patenting
proposition-the inventor either gets a patent on the compound
covering all uses (contemplated or not)24 or gets nothing.25 Utility is the

patentability lever 26 that allows the Patent Office and the courts to

18. Id.
19. Id.; cf. O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1853) (fearing that early patents could
"shut[ ] the door against inventions of other persons").
20. See infra note 260 (sources discussing academic research and the level of support from
the federal government); Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jerry Avorn, University-Based Science and
Biotechnology Products:Defining the Boundariesof Intellectual Property, 293 JAMA 850, 852-53
(2005) (noting that public funding has accounted for a diminishing percentage of total research
funding). Basic research is "[e]xperimental or theoretical work undertaken primarily to acquire
new knowledge of the underlying foundations of phenomena and observable facts, without any
particular application or use in view." NAT'L CTR. FOR SCI. & ENG'G STAT., NAT'L SCI. FOUND.,

SCIENCE & ENGINEERING INDICATORS 2018, at 4-105 (2018).
21. This could happen if the inventor discloses X in the peer-reviewed literature. See infra
Part III (discussing the anticommons idea in patent law).
22. See Jordan P. Karp, Note, Experimental Use as Patent Infringement: The Impropriety of
a Broad Exception, 100 YALE L.J. 2169, 2180 (1991) ("After all, but for the patentee's inventive
efforts and . .. willingness to disclose the fruits of those efforts, competitors would not even be in
a position to develop [their downstream innovations].").
23. Kesselheim & Avorn, supra note 20, at 852.
24. In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see also infra notes 149-150 and
accompanying text (noting that even uses that are not known or disclosed are patented in
this scenario).
25. Paul H. Eggert, Uses, New Uses and Chemical Patents--A Proposal, 51 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y
768, 775 (1969).
26. The patentability requirements appear in Title 35 of the United States Code. Briefly, the
claimed invention must be useful, novel, nonobvious, and directed to patentable subject matter. 35
U.S.C. §§ 101-103. In addition, the application must adequately describe, enable, and set forth the
best mode contemplated for carrying out the invention, and conclude with claims that delineate
the invention with particularity. Id. § 112(a)-(b).
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choose "nothing," 27 which is hard to swallow. 28 This reveals a reality of
modern patent law: basic research in unpredictable fields, "no matter
how important and valuable, does not merit protection and is therefore
not useful in the patent sense."29 For these inventions, patent law is
unwilling "to grant exclusive rights for what is merely one step in a line
of research. . . . [It] requires an inventor to know something about the
trajectory of the future research and its ultimate practical
application." 30 This reality has "drive[n] a wedge between academic
science and the patent system." 31
This paradigm raises two intriguing questions that deserve
more attention from courts and scholars. First, why should an
inventor's inability to articulate a practicalapplication for X at the time
patent protection is sought raise concerns about blocking future
research or the commercialization of new uses discovered by others
downstream? 32 As the law currently stands, disclosing a single practical
application for X allows an inventor to get a broad patent that can
dominate an entire technical field. 33 The point is that the inventor's
disclosed use for X in the patent application-practical or researchdoes not portend blocking behavior. 34 Second, why should a practical,
non-research-based use for X be a patentability requirement? There is
a strong normative argument that affording patent protection for
research on or with X serves the instrumental justification of patents-

27.

See Eggert, supra note 25, at 775 (describing two cases where the courts chose "nothing");

DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 109

(2009) ("[T]he utility rule announced in Brenner v. Manson is applied only in biotechnology and
chemical cases." (footnote omitted)).
28. "[I]t is difficult to make the case that the right amount of intellectual property protection
for such inventions is zero." Dmitry Karshtedt, The Completeness Requirement in Patent Law, 56
B.C. L. REV. 949, 1014 (2015).
29. Michael Risch, Reinventing Usefulness, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1195, 1220 (emphasis added);
see also BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 27, at 111 ("[D]eveloping a new molecule without any
particular use is not a completed innovation, but merely the opening stage of a long and complex
research process."). But patents are permitted for basic research in predictable fields. See Stanley
H. Cohen & Charles H. Schwartz, Editorial Note, Do Chemical Intermediates Have Patentable
Utility?, 29 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 87, 90 (1960) ("Any non-frivolous, non-injurious use, even if only
in a laboratory, will suffice.").
30. John F. Duffy, Embryonic Inventions and Embryonic Patents: Prospects, Prophecies, and
&

Pedis Possessio, in PERSPECTIVES ON COMMERCIALIZING INNOVATION 234, 235 (F. Scott Kieff

Troy A. Paredes eds., 2012).
31. Peter Lee, Patents and the University, 63 DUKE L.J. 1, 23-24 (2013).
32. See infra Part ILA (discussing how altering the scope of claims can better avoid this
blocking problem).
33.

See infra notes 149-150 and accompanying text (noting that patents can block future uses

which are not disclosed or known when the patent is granted).
34. See infra note 159 and accompanying text (acknowledging that courts are willing to
tolerate upstream patents as long as the original inventor can articulate a practical use).
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to promote scientific progress. 35 Throughout most of U.S. patent law's
history, the courts and Patent Office agreed that research inputs like X
were patentable despite the lack of a known practical application.3 6
This Article responds to these questions by introducing a new
form of intellectual property-a research patent-which would allow an
inventor to claim X "for use in research." 37 The nuts and bolts of
acquiring a research patent would be the same as a traditional patent.
And like a traditional patent, a research patent owner could extract its
full value through licensing and enforcement. Remedies for
infringement would include injunctive relief and damages based on
the value of noninfringing products (like X) that emerge from the
infringing research. 38
A few additional points about the proposal bear mentioning
First,
it admittedly goes against the grain of most legal
here.
scholarship on patent reform, which seeks to raise patentability
standards or otherwise make patents harder to obtain. 39 But the limited
protection offered by research patents should allay concerns about
overbreadth or quality. Second, implementing the proposal would not

require a substantial investment of resources or a major reform of the
current regime. Although the Patent Office would have to recognize a
new form of patent protection, examining research patent applications
would place little additional burden on the agency. Third, the ability to

obtain a patent on early-stage basic research (which is not possible
under the current regime)4 0 would provide robust

incentives for

35. The constitutional mandate of the patent system is "[t]o promote the Progress
of ... useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to .. . Inventors the exclusive Right to
their ... Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. After Manson, the Supreme Court stated that
"[t]he patent laws promote this progress by offering inventors exclusive rights for a limited period
as an incentive for their inventiveness and research efforts." Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S.
303, 307 (1980). For commentary on patent law's instrumental justification, see Arti Kaur Rai,
Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U.
L. REV. 77, 116 n.215 (1999).
36. See infra note 49 and accompanying text (citing cases holding that value for educational
and research purposes is sufficient to establish utility).
37. See infra Part II (introducing the research patent concept).
38. See infra Part II (explaining the enforcement mechanisms of the proposed
research patents).
39. See generally, e.g., BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 27 (discussing how the patent system
can best adapt to the modern world); ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND

ITS DISCONTENTS (2004) (discussing how the current patent system is stifling innovation and
progress); Michael J. Meurer, Patent Examination Priorities, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 675
(2009) (assessing how the Patent Office may more efficiently set its patent application
examination priorities).
40. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text (laying out the current regime and
its rationale).
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inventors to opt for research patents. 4 1 Fourth, an inventor who gets a
research patent on X could still obtain a traditional patent on the
compound if the traditional patent application is timely filed.42 Thus,
the research patent could serve as a placeholder for a traditional patent,
thereby creating an incentive for the inventor to (quickly) seek potential
practical applications for X.43 Fifth, implementing research patents
would promote the disclosure, development, and use of X-which all
align with the patent system's basic goal "to protect and promote
advances in science and technology." 44
The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows. Part I explores
how and why research inputs in unpredictable technologies receive
harsh scrutiny in the patent system. Part II introduces research
patents. It discusses how they would be acquired and enforced as well
as what happens when a practical use for the research input is
discovered. Finally, Part III explores the policy implications of research
patents. It offers a theoretical justification for the proposal, addresses
concerns about (too much) patent-owner control of downstream uses,
and makes the normative case for giving research its due in patent law.
I. ARE RESEARCH INPUTS (INHERENTLY) USEFUL?
A. Utility as a PatentabilityLever
The vagueness of the term "useful," combined with the absence
of legislative guidance, makes utility the most malleable patentability
requirement. 4 5 Malleability makes sense in patent law. As technology
evolves, patent law must respond. 46 But malleability also allows the
41.

For example, an early-stage patent allows its owner to play a role in coordinating the

future development of the technology. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent
System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 276-77 (1977) (articulating the prospect theory of patents).
42. See infra Part II (explaining what would happen to a research patent when a practical
application is discovered).
43. Cf. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1023 n.26 (1989) (discussing incentives for researchers
"to keep an eye out for potential commercial applications").
44. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 617 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring); see also supra note
35 and accompanying text (discussing the constitutional mandate of the patent system).
45. Machin, supra note 11, at 425 ("[D]ifferent observers see in it different things."); see also
John F. Duffy, Rules and Standardson the Forefrontof Patentability,51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 609,
639 (2009) (noting that the utility requirement is governed by a "standard[ ] requiring judgments
on a range of factors that admit of no precise lines"); Mark P. McKenna & Christopher Jon
Sprigman, What's In, and What's Out: How IP's Boundary Rules Shape Innovation, 30 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 491, 508-16 (2017) (arguing that patent law lacks a coherent theory of utility).
46. This makes sense because "any law[s] purporting to provide a regulatory foundation for
innovation must be able to account for both the broad range of technologies and the rapid pace of
[technological] change." R. Polk Wagner, Of Patents and Path Dependency: A Comment on Burk
and Lemley, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1341, 1344 (2003).
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courts to create technology-specific patentability standards to achieve
certain outcomes. 4 7 To wit, the courts have imposed a clear but harsh
utility standard for chemical inventions. If the only known use of a
chemical compound at the time of filing is for research, it lacks utility
within the meaning of the Patent Act. 48
Until the mid-twentieth century, a de minimis utility standard
applied to all inventions. 49 Some beneficial use was sufficient 50 unless
the invention was inoperable 51 or detrimental to the public interest. 52
As noted in one treatise:
Want of utility is a bar seldom raised against an application by the Patent Office and
[U]tility in its broadest
seldom successfully employed as a defense in [litigation] . ...
sense approaches a presumption more nearly than any other point recited in the statute
and is seldom questioned by the courts or the Patent Office . . .. 53

Putting aside inventions that were once deemed immoral, 54 utility was
rarely questioned during this era:

47. Cf. Risch, supranote 29, at 1222 ("Recognition of a normative bias against basic science
is important; it frees . .. the courts to either embrace or oppose basic science by varying utility
requirements in a particular technological field. . . . [T]o the extent the field is favored, . . . utility
could be made easier to prove.").

48. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 535 (1966).
49. See, e.g., Potter v. Tone, 36 App. D.C. 181, 184-85 (D.C. Cir. 1911) (rejecting the
contention that a compound must have a commercial use and holding that its disclosure in the
patent document had value for educational and research purposes sufficient to establish utility);
Ex parte Watt, 63 U.S.P.Q. 163, 165 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1942) (determining that a chemical
compound whose sole use was that of a chemical intermediate met the utility requirement).
50. Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37, 37 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 1,217).
51. The issue is whether the invention could achieve its intended result. See infra notes 8284 and accompanying text (discussing the three prongs of the utility test).
52. Bedford, 3 F. Cas. at 37. Justice Story believed that the market should be the best judge
of an invention's utility. Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass.
1817) (No. 8,568) ("[Whether the invention] be more or less useful [than existing products] is a
circumstance very material to the interests of the patentee, but of no importance to the public. If
it be not extensively useful, it will silently sink into contempt and disregard.").
53.

1 WALTER F. ROGERS, THE LAW OF PATENTS AS ILLUSTRATED BY LEADING CASES 9 (1914),

quoted in part in In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172, 180 (C.C.P.A. 1960). The U.S. Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals ("C.C.P.A.") was a five-judge Article III appellate court on the same level as the
U.S. Courts of Appeals. The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 abolished the C.C.P.A.
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). Soon after its creation, the Federal Circuit adopted C.C.P.A.
decisional law as binding precedent. See S. Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir.
1982) (en bane) ('That body of law represented by the holdings of the Court of Claims and the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals ... is herewith adopted by this court sitting in bane.").
54. Most noteworthy here were patents for gambling devices. See Nat'l Automatic Device Co.
v. Lloyd, 40 F. 89, 90 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1889) ("[T]he only use to which the invention has been put
being for gambling purposes, I must hold that it is not a useful device, within the meaning of the
patent law, as its use so far has been only pernicious and hurtful."); Brewer v. Lichtenstein, 278
F. 512, 513 (7th Cir. 1922) (holding that a patent with "[n]o other utility than as a lottery
device ... has no useful function"). But this is no longer the law. See Ex parte Murphy, 200
U.S.P.Q. 801, 803 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1977) (reversing an examiner's lack-of-utility rejection for a
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has never been the slightest

obedience to the requirement that inventions must be found useful. . . . Not only is it the

fact that the Patent Office pays no heed to the requirement of utility, but it is also true
that when one attempts to distinguish an invention from a prior patent by showing that
the invention is operative and useful while the prior patent . . . is wholly inoperative
and consequently not useful, he fails to make the slightest impression upon the
Patent Office . . ..

55

The standard was truly de minimis. 56
Throughout most of U.S. patent law's history, the courts and
Patent Office agreed that chemical compounds had utility despite the
lack of a practical use. 57 As Justice Harlan explained in his Manson
dissent, "usefulness was typically regarded as inherent during a long
and prolific period of chemical research and development in this
country." 58 But in the 1950s, the Patent Office abandoned its liberal
utility standard for chemical inventions. 59 This triggered a clash
between the Patent Office and the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals ("C.C.P.A.") 60 over the inherent utility of chemical compounds.
A key opinion addressing this issue is the 1960 case In re
Nelson.61 The applicant sought to patent several compounds known as
intermediates-chemicals whose purpose is to serve as a research input
claim to a slot machine), cited with approval in Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d
1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (explaining that there is no basis in 35 U.S.C. § 101 to deem an
invention unpatentable for a lack of utility because it has capacity to deceive).
55. Wm. Macomber, JudicialDiscretion in Patent Causes, 24 YALE L.J. 99, 105 (1914).
56. "As to the term 'useful,' the courts have construed the condition expressed by it so liberally
that it almost never serves to defeat a patent." HENRY CHILDS MERWIN, THE PATENTABILITY OF

INVENTIONS 75 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1883), quoted in Nelson, 280 F.2d at 179.
57. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (citing cases holding that certain chemical
patents met the utility requirement).
58. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 540 (1966) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
59. In 1956, the Commissioner of Patents squarely rejected the Patent Office's pre-war liberal
view of utility in chemical cases:
[I]n the past very little attention was paid to the requirement for a disclosure of utility
in chemical cases. Some chemical patents were issued with specifications reciting the
barest suggestions of uses for the new compounds claimed, or even without uses being

stated at all. It was generally the position of the Patent Office that a chemical compound
could be regarded as an intermediate substance useful in the preparation of other
compounds, since it was regarded as obvious that any organic compound could be
so used.

In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 952-53 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (Rich, J., dissenting) (quoting Robert C. Watson,
Comm'r of Pats., U.S. Pat. Off., Remarks to the Division of Medicinal Chemistry of the American
Chemical Society (Sept. 19, 1956)). There was a C.C.P.A. decision in the 1950s that aligned with
the Commissioner's view. See In re Bremner, 182 F.2d 216, 217 (C.C.P.A. 1950) (affirming the
rejection of a claim to a chemical because there was neither an assertion of utility nor "anything
indicating what use of the product may be made"). The C.C.P.A., however, eventually reverted
back to a liberal utility standard. See In re Szwarc, 319 F.2d 277, 285 (C.C.P.A. 1963) (rejecting
Bremner), cited in Manson, 383 U.S. at 530.
60. See supra note 53 (discussing the C.C.P.A.).
61. 280 F.2d at 180, overruled by Kirk, 376 F.2d at 946.
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for other compounds.6 2 The issue was whether an intermediate has its
own utility or whether the applicant had to disclose a use for the final
product in order to patent the intermediate. 6 3 Writing for the majority, 64
Judge Giles Rich (the codrafter of the 1952 Patent Act and regarded by
many as "the founding father of modern patent law") 65 explained that
requiring the latter would frustrate fundamental goals of the
patent system:
We have never received a clear answer to the question "Useful to whom and for what?"
Surely a new group of steroid intermediates is useful to chemists doing research on
steroids . . . . They are often actually placed on the market before much, if anything, is
known as to what they are "good" for, other than experimentation and the making of other
compounds in the important field of research. Refusal to protect them at this stage would
inhibit their wide dissemination, together with the knowledge of them which a patent
disclosure conveys, which disclosure the potential protection encourages. This would tend
to retard rather than promote progress.

66

The Supreme Court settled the conflict concerning the intrinsic
utility of chemical compounds in Brenner v. Manson.67 The case was
about Manson's attempt to provoke an interference-a fight between
two inventors over who is entitled to a patent. 68 The invention was a
new process for making a steroid ("S'). By the time Manson filed his
patent application, the Patent Office had already issued a patent on the

process to a competitor. 69 Although Manson could prove that he was the

62. Id. For example, a chemist reacts A + B to make I(the intermediate). Then, the chemist
can react I with C, D, or something else to make other compounds.
63. Id. at 175. Interestingly, Nobel Laureate and legendary organic chemist Robert B.
Woodward obtained a patent on a chemical intermediate in 1957. Production of Steroid
Intermediate, U.S. Patent No. 2,802,873 (filed Apr. 13, 1951) (issued Aug. 13, 1957). The
intermediate's asserted usefulness "in the production of steroids, particularly the adrenal cortical
hormones such as cortisone" cleared the 35 U.S.C. § 101 hurdle since cortisone had a wellestablished utility. See id. col. 2, 11. 1-2 (explaining the utility of the patent).
64. For dissenting views, see Nelson, 280 F.2d at 190 (Worley, J., dissenting) ("[G]ranting a
patent here will ... give appellants an unearned monopoly on a substantial area in the field of
chemistry .... "); id. at 190-92 (Kirkpatrick, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of reading
"useful" out of the patent statute).
65.

F. ScoTT KIEFF, PAULINE NEWMAN, HERBERT F. ScHWARTZ

& HENRY E. SMITH,

PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 24 (5th ed. 2011). Judge Rich joined the C.C.P.A. in 1956 and later
served on the Federal Circuit until his death in 1999 at age ninety-five. Id.
66. Nelson, 280 F.2d at 180-81 (emphasis added).
67. 383 U.S. 519 (1966).
68. Under the first-to-invent system, patent rights are awarded to the first inventor. 35
U.S.C. § 102(g) (repealed by the America Invents Act of 2011 ("AIA")). When two parties claim the
same invention, the Patent Office institutes an "interference" proceeding to determine priority
(i.e., which party is entitled to a patent). Id. The first party to reduce the invention to practice
usually wins; however, a party that was "first to conceive the invention but last to reduce it to
practice" (either actively or constructively) will win if that party "demonstrates reasonable
diligence [toward] reduction to practice." Cooper v. Goldfarb, 240 F.3d 1378, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
69. See Process for the Production of 2-Methyl-Dihydrotestosterones, U.S. Patent No.
2,908,693 (filed Dec. 17, 1956) (issued Oct. 13, 1959).
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first to invent the process, the examiner would not declare an
interference because Manson failed to disclose a utility for S.70
Manson argued that S's utility could be presumed because
similar steroids were known to inhibit tumors in mice. 71 The Patent
Office disagreed because, in its view, the unpredictable nature of steroid
chemistry made it impossible to presume that S would have the same
tumor-inhibiting properties. 72 A divided C.C.P.A. reversed, holding that
"a process which operates as disclosed to produce a known product is
[itself] 'useful' within the meaning of section 101."73
The Supreme Court reversed the C.C.P.A. and resolved the
question about the intrinsic utility of chemical inventions. It held that
an inventor seeking to patent a new process for making a compound
could only do so if the inventor establishes utility for the compound. 74
Unless and until a chemical invention can provide a specific benefit in
its currently available form, "there is insufficient justification for
permitting an applicant to engross what may prove to be a broad
field." 75 A patent could become a "hunting license," 76 conferring the
power to "block off whole areas of scientific development, without
compensating benefit to the public." 77 Dmitry Karshtedt provides a
hypothetical that illustrates the fear:
[T]he concern behind allowing a patent on a chemical compound without an identified
consumer utility is that subsequent researchers who discover such a use-for example,
biological activity against cancer cells-will be beholden to the owner of the patent on the
compounds. The patentee might threaten litigation to enjoin downstream research,

charge an unreasonable royalty, or tie up the follow-on researcher in extensive, costly
negotiations over the patent right. Faced with this prospect, the follow-on researcher

70. When a person believes that he or she is the inventor of the subject matter claimed by
another in a patent application or issued patent, the remedy is to file a patent application claiming
that subject matter to "provoke" an interference with the other application or issued patent. See
35 U.S.C. § 135 (pre-AIA) (describing the structure of interference proceedings).
71. Manson, 383 U.S. at 521-22.
72. As stated by the Board, "It is our view that the statutory requirement of usefulness of a
product cannot be presumed merely because it happens to be closely related to another compound
which is known to be useful." Id. at 522. This is true because "minor changes in the structure of a

steroid may produce profound changes in its biological activity." Id. at 532 n.19 (quoting Transcript
of Record at 52, Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (No. 58)).
73. In re Manson, 333 F.2d 234, 236 (C.C.P.A. 1964). The court's rationale was that a process
is a separate category of invention specifically recognized in the statute. See also 35 U.S.C. § 100(b)
("The term 'process' means process, art or method, and includes a new use of a known process,
machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material."); id. § 101 ("Whoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process .... ").

74.
75.
76.
77.

Manson, 383 U.S. at 531, 534-35.
Id. at 534-35.
Id. at 536.
Id. at 534 (footnote omitted).
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might forgo investigating a certain chemical structure during the life of the patent, and
society would then lose out .... 78

So the fear is that an early-stage patent on a research
input could become a "bottleneck" that stifles downstream research

and innovation. 79
B. The Current Paradigm
Inventions emerging from unpredictable fields receive special

scrutiny in patent law. For example, as described by one judge,
inventors in the field of chemistry are "improperly set apart from all
inventors as a class"80 and are burdened with special requirements,
including the need for "more of a disclosure of utility .. . than what [the
Patent Office and the courts] require from inventors in the other

technical areas." 8 1
The current utility test has three prongs. The first prong,
operability, requires that the invention be capable of achieving its
intended result. 82 The question is whether a person having ordinary
skill in the art ("PHOSITA")a 3 would consider the inventor's

assertions credible. 84
78. Karshtedt, supra note 28, at 966 (footnotes omitted); see also Katherine J. Strandburg,
What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 123
(2004) ("The concern with patented research tools arises from the fear that a research tool may
give the tool inventor the ability to block technological progress by controlling the research that
may be performed using the tool .... "); Peter Yun-hyoung Lee, Inverting the Logic of Scientific
Discovery: Applying Common Law Patentable Subject Matter Doctrine to ConstrainPatents on
Biotechnology Research Tools, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 79, 81 (2005) ("Allowing [patents] over such
research tools permits propertization near the beginning of the development chain and threatens
to establish individual control over broad areas of scientific research.').
79. Karshtedt, supra note 28, at 967.
80. In re Joly, 376 F.2d 906, 929 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (Smith J., dissenting).
81. Id.; cf. David A. Anderson & Edward E. Dyson, Editorial Note, Some Special Problems
with the Utility Requirement in Chemical Patents, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 809, 817 (1967)
(explaining that Manson and its progeny "will work a hardship on chemical researchers, who have
now been excluded from the class of people for whom compounds are 'useful'"); Brent Nelson
Rushforth, Comment, The Patentability of Chemical Intermediates, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 497, 513
(1968) (same).
82. Mitchell v. Tilghman, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 287, 396 (1873).
83. The PHOSITA is a hypothetical construct of patent law akin to the reasonably prudent
person in torts. See Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
Factors relevant to constructing the PHOSITA in a particular technical field include the
sophistication of the technology, the educational level of the inventor, the educational level of
active workers in the field, the types of problems encountered in the art, the prior art solutions to
those problems, and the rapidity with which innovations are made. Env't Designs, Ltd. v. Union
Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
84. The Patent Office can establish reasonable doubt if the applicant's disclosure "suggests
an inherently unbelievable undertaking or involves implausible scientific principles." In re
Cortright, 165 F.3d 1353, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (quoting In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed.
Cir. 1995)).
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The two other prongs, "specific" and "substantial" utility, were
identified but not fully defined in Manson.85 The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit did define these terms in In re Fisher86 when it
adopted the Patent Office's guidelines for assessing utility.87 For
substantial utility, a PHOSITA must be able to use the invention to
provide a "significant" and "immediate" benefit to the public. 88 The
patent application "must show that an invention is useful to the public
as disclosed in its current form, not that it may prove useful at some
future date after further research." 89 So basic research, chemical
intermediates, and methods of making a chemical compound where the
compound itself has no identifiable utility all fail this prong. 90 Thus,
this prong is rooted both in ripeness concerns (avoiding problems that
might arise from granting patent protection too early)9 1 and the

85. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1966) (briefly mentioning specific and
substantial utility).
86. 421 F.3d 1365, 1371-72 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
87. Id. at 1372 ("The [Patent Office's] standards for assessing whether a claimed invention
has a specific and substantial utility comport with this court's interpretation . . . .") (citing U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1,092 (Jan. 5, 2001)
[hereinafter Utility Examination Guidelines]). The guidelines have been incorporated into the
Manual of Patent Examining Procedure. See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., MANUAL OF PATENT

EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2107 (2018), https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/old/e9r082017/mpep-2100.pdf [https://perma.cc/LBM7-VQN9] [hereinafter MPEP] (detailing guidelines for
examination of applications for compliance with the utility requirement).
88. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1371 (citing Nelson v. Bowler, 626 F.2d 853, 856 (C.C.P.A. 1980)).
89. Id. The Patent Office's view is that "any reasonable use that an applicant has identified
for the invention that can be viewed as providing a public benefit should be accepted as
sufficient. ... " MPEP, supra note 87, § 2107.01(I)(B). Ultimately, examiners "must distinguish
between inventions that have a specifically identified substantial utility and inventions whose
asserted utility requires further research to identify or reasonably confirm." Id. § 2107.01(1)(C).
90. See MPEP, supra note 87, § 2107.01(I)(B) (identifying each of these as unpatentable); see
also In re '318 Pat. Infringement Litig., 583 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ("Allowing ideas,
research proposals, or objects only of research to be patented has the potential to give priority to
the wrong party and to 'confer power to block off whole areas of scientific development, without
compensating benefit to the public.'" (quoting Manson, 383 U.S. at 534)). But this is only true in
unpredictable technologies. See Cohen & Schwartz, supranote 29, at 90 (noting that outside the
chemical context courts are more liberal about finding utility); Note, The Utility Requirement in
the Patent Law, 53 GEO. L.J. 154, 157 (1964) (explaining that in the mechanical arts, "if the
function of the end product satisfies the statutory requirement of utility, that satisfaction is
imputed to the intermediate contributing invention."). Dmitry Karshtedt suggests that there
might be an unwritten "completeness" requirement of patentability which "is concerned with

whether . . the invention is too foundational to qualify for a patent." Karshtedt, supra note 28, at
952 (footnote omitted). Such inventions include "artifacts of basic research." Id. at 952 n.16.
91. See Manson, 383 U.S. at 534-35 (articulating concerns surrounding granting a patent too
early); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1646
(2003) (explaining that the rule emerging from Manson is that "[b]y giving patent protection too
early-before the actual use of the product has been identified-patent law might deter research
by others on the use of the product.").
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substantive view that research inputs in unpredictable fields (like
chemical intermediates) 92 lack a legally acceptable utility. 93
Finally, specific utility requires that an invention "provide a
well-defined and particular benefit to the public." 94 This prong denies
patents for inventions where the asserted use is "so vague as to be
meaningless." 95 For example, usefulness for "biological activity" or
96
"pharmaceutical purposes" fail the requirement.
A lack-of-utility rejection triggers a burden-shifting process. 97
Once the examiner has established a prima facie case of a lack of utility,
the burden shifts to the applicant to either attack or rebut it.98 An
applicant can successfully attack the prima facie case if the examiner

produces no (or insufficient) evidence to support a finding of a lack of
utility. 99 Alternatively, an applicant can concede the prima facie case

and rebut it. So, for example, if specific utility is at issue, the applicant
must come forward with persuasive arguments or proof that the
100
A
invention provides an immediate benefit to the public.
10 1
an
Whether
preponderance of the evidence is the standard of proof.
invention complies with the utility requirement of § 101 is a question

of fact.1 0 2

92. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing a case involving chemical
intermediates).
93. Sean B. Seymore, ForesightBias in Patent Law, 90 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 1105, 1118-20
(2015) (discussing patent law's aversion to building block inventions like chemical intermediates).
94. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1371.
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., Ex parte Aggarwal, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d 1334, 1339 (B.P.A.I. 1992) ("There is no
question that appellants have made an important discovery with regard to chemical compounds
(proteins) which are the subject of serious scientific investigation but [it is nevertheless
unpatentable because of its] unverified and speculative utility.").
97. In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (describing the framework).
98. See id. ("Only after the PTO provides evidence showing that one of ordinary skill in the
art would reasonably doubt the asserted utility does the burden shift to the applicant to provide
rebuttal evidence sufficient to convince such a person of the invention's asserted utility.").
99. MPEP, supra note 87, § 2107(II)(C); see also In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (explaining that the examiner bears the initial burden of presenting a prima facie case of
unpatentability); Fregeau v. Mossinghoff, 776 F.2d 1034, 1038 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (applying the prima
facie case to 35 U.S.C. § 101).
100. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing one prong of the
utility requirement).
101. Oetiker, 977 F.2d at 1445; see also In re Langer, 503 F.2d 1380, 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1974)
(affirming the Patent Office's rejection of the applicant's claims because the prima facie case for
lack of utility remained un-rebutted).
102. Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 956 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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C. The "DoubleStandard"
The harsh treatment of research inputs implicates a
quintessential paradox in patent law. This paradox involves noveltythe statutory requirement that an invention be new.10 3 If the invention
is already known, society loses free access to knowledge already
in the public domain 104 and thus receives no benefit from a
patent's issuance. 105
Assessing novelty requires a comparison of the claimed
invention with the prior art-preexisting knowledge and technology
already in the public domain. 106 Documents (like issued patents and
printed publications), devices, and activities are sources of prior art. 107
A specific document, device, or activity asserted against the claimed
invention is called a prior art reference. 108
The America Invents Act of 2011 ("AIA") converted the U.S.

patent system from a first-to-invent regime to a first-inventor-to-file
regime. 109 To qualify as novelty-defeating prior art under the AIA, 110 a
reference must satisfy three criteria. First, it must predate the

103. 35 U.S.C. § 101 ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter . .. may obtain a patent .... " (emphasis added)).
104. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989); Graham v. John
Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).
105. GEORGE

TICKNOR CURTIS,

A TREATISE

ON THE

LAW OF

PATENTS FOR USEFUL

&

INVENTIONS § 292, at 394 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 2d ed. 1854). The essence of the U.S. patent
system is a quid pro quo between the patentee and the public. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S.
55, 63 (1998) ("[T]he patent system represents a carefully crafted bargain that encourages both
the creation and the public disclosure of new and useful advances in technology, in return for an
exclusive monopoly for a limited period of time."). If the invention is already in the public domain,
a patent should not issue because the inventor cannot give the public anything that it does not
already possess. Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 23 (1829); see also Robert P. Merges,
Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability,7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 12-13 (1992) (explaining that
the logic behind the novelty requirement "is fairly straightforward . . [because if] information is
already in the public domain when the 'inventor' seeks to patent it[,] society has no need to grant
a patent to get this information").
106. Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (citing
Graham, 383 U.S. at 6).
107. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (outlining what may be considered prior art). For a comprehensive
discussion of prior art categories, see Timothy R. Holbrook, PriorArt and Possession, 60 WM.
MARY L. REV. 123, 148-83 (2018).
108. HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ, PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 18 (3d ed. 2001).

109. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(b), 125 Stat. 284, 285-87
(2011) (amending § 102(a) and repealing § 102(g)).
110. Prior art is also used to gauge nonobviousness-the statutory requirement that bars a
patent if the claimed invention is a trivial extension of what is already known. See 35 U.S.C. § 103
(requiring that the claim is not obvious to a PHOSITA).
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applicant's filing date.1 11 Second, the applicant's claimed invention1 12

must be identically disclosed or described within the four corners of the
reference.113 Third, the reference must be enabling-meaning that it
must disclose the invention in sufficient detail to teach a PHOSITA how
to make it without undue experimentation. 114 A reference satisfying all
three criteria "anticipates" the applicant's claim115 and renders it
unpatentable.11 6 Anticipation is a question of fact.117
The enablement criterion is particularly relevant here.
Enablement questions typically arise in two contexts in patent law.
Section 112(a) compels a patent applicant to submit a written
description of the invention11 8 that is sufficient to enable a PHOSITA to
make and use it without undue experimentation. 119 This statutory or

111. Id. § 102(a)(1) (denying patentability if "the claimed invention was patented ... before
the effective filing date of the claimed invention"); id. § 102(a)(2) (denying patentability if "the
claimed invention was described in a patent ...

[which]

names another inventor

and was

effectively filed before the effective filing date of the claimed invention").
112. A patent claim must define "the subject matter which the [applicant] ... regards as the
invention." Id. § 112(b).
113. For example, if an applicant seeks to claim a paper clip made with titanium and nickel,
the reference must also disclose a paper clip made with titanium and nickel. Sean B. Seymore,
Rethinking Novelty in Patent Law, 60 DUKE L.J. 919, 923 (2011). In this hypothetical, titanium
and nickel are claim elements.
114. In re Morsa, 713 F.3d 104, 110 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Determining whether a disclosure in an
asserted reference is enabling for novelty-defeating purposes is a legal conclusion that rests on
underlying factual inquiries. Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The
Federal Circuit has set forth several factors relevant to the enablement analysis in In re Wands,
858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988). They are: (1) the amount of direction or guidance presented in
the disclosure, (2) the existence of working examples, (3) the nature of the invention, (4) the
predictability or unpredictability of the art, (5) the PHOSITA's level of skill, (6) the state of the
prior art, (7) the breadth of the claims, and (8) the quantity of experimentation necessary to
practice the claimed invention. Impax Lab'ys., Inc. v. Aventis Pharms. Inc., 545 F.3d 1312, 131415 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (applying the Wands factors in the anticipatory enablement context).
115. See In re Skvorecz, 580 F.3d 1262, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ("A rejection for 'anticipation'
means that the invention is not new.").
116. See In re Morsa, 803 F.3d 1374, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (finding that a reference was
disclosed and enabling, preventing a patent); Impax Lab'ys., 545 F.3d at 1314 (finding that a
reference was not enabling, and thus did not anticipate the claims). Thus, "anticipation is the
converse of novelty: if an invention lacks novelty, it is anticipated." Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent
Anticipation and Obviousness as Possession, 65 EMORY L.J. 987, 993 (2016).
117. In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Bischoff v. Wethered, 76 U.S. (9
Wall.) 812, 814-15 (1869)).
118. The written description is the part of the patent document that completely describes the
invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). It includes background information, a summary of the invention,
and a detailed description of it. MUELLER, supra note 12, at 1167. Although I will not discuss it in
this Article, the terms "written description" and "specification" are often used interchangeably
(and mistakenly) in patent law. KIEFF ET AL., supra note 65, at 155 n.4.
119. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) ("The specification shall contain a written description of the
invention .. . as to enable [a PHOSITA] ... to make and use the same .... "). Although "undue
experimentation" does not appear in the statute, "it is well established that enablement requires
that the [written description] teach those in the art to make and use the invention without undue
experimentation." Wands, 858 F.2d at 737.
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patent-supporting form of enablement places an outer limit on the scope
of the claims. 120 The nonstatutory, patent-defeating form applied for
anticipation purposes 121 asks whether a PHOSITA in possession of the
prior art reference could make the invention without undue
experimentation. 1 2 2 Thus, the enablement standard for patentability
differs from the enablement standard for anticipation: 123 a prior
disclosure of the invention that does not teach a PHOSITA how to use it
can still serve as prior art.124
This "double standard" 125 has created one of patent law's major
paradoxes: making or describing how to make a research input can
serve as anticipatory prior art and thus be patent-defeating, yet the
research input itself is unpatentable if it lacks a practical utility. 1 26
While this standard makes sense, 127 it frustrates patent policy by
encouraging inventors to delay disclosure and maintain secrecy unless
and until a practical application is discovered. 128
To illustrate, consider a university researcher who invents Xand
discloses its method of preparation in a peer-reviewed scientific journal.
Suppose the researcher subsequently discovers a practical use for X.
120. The scope of the claims must "be less than or equal to the scope of the enablement." Nat'l
Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The
scope of enablement "is that which is disclosed in the [written description] plus the scope of what
would be known to [a PHOSITA] without undue experimentation." Id.
121. Novo Nordisk Pharms., Inc. v. Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp., 424 F.3d 1347, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
"Enablement" does not appear within the text of § 102. Anticipatory enablement is a "judicially
imposed limitation" on § 102 that the description of the subject matter in the reference must be an
enabling description. In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929, 939 (C.C.P.A. 1962).
122. Novo Nordisk, 424 F.3d at 1355 (citing Rasmusson v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 413
F.3d 1318, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); see also In re Hafner, 410 F.2d 1403, 1405 (C.C.P.A. 1969)
(affirming a patent rejection for failure to disclose how to use the invention).
123. Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Cox Fibernet Va., Inc., 602 F.3d 1325, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ("The
standard for what constitutes

proper enablement of a prior art reference for purposes of

anticipation under section 102 . . . differs from the enablement standard under section 112."
(quoting Rasmusson, 413 F.3d at 1325)).
124. In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing Rasmusson, 413 F.3d at 1326).
Judge Rich provided a statutory basis for the distinction, noting that § 112 provides that the
written description "must enable [the PHOSITA] to 'use' the invention whereas § 102 makes no
such requirement as to an anticipatory disclosure." Hafner, 410 F.2d at 1405.
125. Hafner, 410 F.2d at 1405 (explaining that the "double standard" is "implicitly[,] if not
explicitly, required by law").
126. This was the factual scenario in Hafner. Id. at 1403-05.
127. For example, if a description of how to make a chemical compound is in the public domain,
it would seem unjust to allow an inventor who discovers a new use to obtain a patent on the
compound. In other words, a patent cannot deny free access to knowledge already available to the

public. See sources cited supra note 104 (providing two examples of courts protecting knowledge
in the public domain).
128. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 538-39 (1966) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (noting that in the chemical research field, the "abstractly logical choice ... [is]
to maintain secrecy until a product use can be discovered"); infra notes 237-248 and accompanying
text (discussing how current doctrine incentivizes secrecy).
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Unfortunately, the inventor's own prior disclosure in the scientific

journal could defeat a subsequent attempt to patent X (by the inventor
or a third party) because the journal publication described how to make
X before the patent application's filing date, thereby constituting
anticipatory prior art. 129 Keep in mind that X was unpatentable when

first made because it lacked a practical use. 130 So, from a patentability
standpoint, the inventor would have been better off keeping quiet and
forgoing (or delaying) publication in the scientific journal.
D. Utility and Useful Disclosures
Statutory enablement compels the applicant to provide a
disclosure that teaches a PHOSITA how to make and use the
invention. 131 The how-to-use requirement of§ 112(a), 132 however, differs
from the utility requirement of § 101. The purpose of the § 112(a) how-

to-use requirement is simply to provide a PHOSITA with a meaningful
disclosure. 133 So the how-to-use prong of § 112(a) is satisfied if the
disclosure teaches a PHOSITA how to use the invention as broadly as
it is claimed without undue experimentation. 134
There is a link between the how-to-use requirement of § 112(a)
and the utility requirement of § 101. Case law dictates that an
invention lacking utility under § 101 fails to satisfy the how-to-use
prong of the enablement requirement of § 112(a) as a matter of law. 135
This makes sense when the § 101 problem is inoperability, because if
the invention cannot operate to achieve the intended result, then it is

129. Hafner, 410 F.2d at 1405; see also 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (denying patentability if "the
claimed invention was . .. described in a printed publication ... before the effective filing date of
the claimed invention"). But the AIA provides a grace period for certain prior disclosures that came
directly or indirectly from the inventor. See id. § 102(b) (discussed infra Part II (providing the one
year grace period)).

130. See supra Part I (discussing utility requirements).
131. See supra note 120 and accompanying text (discussing enablement requirements).
132. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (discussing the disclosure requirements in the
text of § 112(a)).
133. John W. Klooster, HistoricalDevelopments of Contemporary Scope, Impact of Section 112
upon Patent Practice, 6 APLA Q.J. 171, 172 (1978); see also In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172, 181
(C.C.P.A. 1960) (explaining that the purpose of statutory enablement is "the addition [the
disclosure] makes to technical literature immediately upon issuance of the patent").
134. In re Cortright, 165 F.3d 1353, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488,
495-96 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
135. In re Ziegler, 992 F.2d 1197, 1200-01 (Fed. Cir. 1993). But the converse is not true: it is
possible to invent something with utility yet still "fail[ ] so to describe it as to teach the [PHOSITA]
how to practice it." Mowry v. Whitney, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 620, 644 (1871); see also Paul M. Janicke,
Patent Disclosure - Some Problems and Current Developments: PartII, 52 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 757,
768 (1970) (providing examples).
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impossible to enable a PHOSITA to use it.136 But a disclosure can
certainly enable a PHOSITA to use an invention yet fall short of the
harsh utility threshold currently applied to chemical inventions. The
best example is the factual scenario presented in Brenner v. Manson.137
Manson provided an enabling disclosure that taught a PHOSITA how
to both make the steroid at issue and how to use it to make
other compounds.1 38
This last point reveals the paradoxical nature of the utility
requirement as it relates to disclosure. An applicant can disclose X in
sufficient detail to enable a PHOSITA to make and use it for § 112
purposes but nevertheless fail to satisfy the § 101 utility threshold
because Xis merely a research input. 139
II. PATENTING INVENTIONS "FOR USE IN RESEARCH"
This Part proposes a new form of intellectual property-a
research patent-which grants patent rights for research inputs that
lack a practical application at the time patent protection is sought.
A. ClaimingResearch Uses
1. The Primacy of the Patent Claim
Judge Giles Rich once stated that in patent law, "the name of
the game is the claim." 140 Claims are the numbered sentences at the end
of the patent document that define the "technological territory" that the
inventor seeks to control 141 and "provide[ ] the metes and bounds of the
right which the patent confers on the patentee to exclude others from
making, using, or selling the protected invention." 142

136. In re Swartz, 232 F.3d 862, 863 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim
Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
137. See supra Part I (discussing the facts, legal proceedings, and outcome of the case).
138. See In re Manson, 333 F.2d 234, 238-39 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (discussing the utility
requirement and how Manson's disclosure met those requirements). In evaluating Manson's

application, the Patent Office never asserted lack of enablement as grounds for unpatentability.
139. See In re '318 Pat. Infringement Litig., 583 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (describing
how the utility requirement prevents patenting research ideas and objects of research).

140. Giles S. Rich, Extent of Protection and Interpretationof Claims -American Perspectives,
21 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499 (1990).

141. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 839, 844 (1990).
142. Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
At the application stage, the inventor dickers with the Patent Office for an expansive exclusory
right; in litigation, the parties try to convince the court to construe the claims in their favor.
Seymore, supra note 5, at 128-29.
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For research inputs like chemical compounds, an inventor
typically pursues several types of claims. 143 For example, if the
invention is compound Y, which is useful for treating arthritis, the
claim matrix will likely include a "composition" claim to Y, the
compound itself, 144 and one or more "method" claims directed to making

Y or using Y to treat the disease. 145 Method claims provide a fallback
position if the composition claim is unavailable, rejected by the Patent
Office, or invalidated in litigation.146
Claims differ in their scope and potential value. Patentees want
the broadest claim scope possible. 147 A composition claim affords the
most protection. 148 Harold Wegner has explained that
[composition claims] have always been the premium form of patent
chemical industry . ... A claim to the compound, per se, dominates
making that compound and every single use of that compound, every
different components that includes that compound, and every end
149
inclusive of the compound.

143. See JEFFREY G. SHELDON, HOW TO WRITE A PATENT APPLICATION

protection in the
every method of
single mixture of
use composition

§ 6.5.4

(2009) (providing

examples of when and why it is useful to include different statutory classes of claims in a
patent application).
144. MUELLER, supra note 12, at 520-22.
145. See SHELDON, supra note 143, § 6.5.1 (considering different types of claims to file). A
typical method claim in this hypothetical scenario might recite "[a] method of treating arthritis
comprising administering to a patient a therapeutically effective amount of Y." Sean B. Seymore,
PatentingAround Failure, UNIV. PA. L. REV. 1139, 1174 (2018).
146. KIRK TESKA, PATENT SAVVY FOR MANAGERS 121 (2007). A composition claim might be

unavailable because the compound might be covered by an existing patent or in the public domain.
Sean B. Seymore, PatentingNew Uses for Old Inventions, 73 VAND. L. REV. 479, 498 (2020).
147. Merges & Nelson, supra note 141, at 839 ("The economic significance of a patent depends
on its scope: the broader the scope, the larger the number of competing products and processes
that will infringe the patent.").
148. In re Papesch, 315 F.2d 381, 391 (C.C.P.A. 1963) (discussing the "well-recognized
advantages" of composition claims).
149. HAROLD C. WEGNER, PATENT LAW IN BIOTECHNOLOGY, CHEMICALS & PHARMACEUTICALS

§ 260

(1992). An inventor of a product need only disclose a single use to satisfy patent law's utility
requirement. See In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (accepting a disclosure of
chemotherapeutic agents that did not disclose the specific disease against which the agents are
used as meeting the utility requirement). But the resulting patent covers the full scope of the
product, including all uses. In re Thuau, 135 F.2d 344, 347 (C.C.P.A. 1943); accord Utility
Examination Guidelines, supra note 87, at 1095 ("A patent on a composition gives exclusive
rights . . . for a limited time, even if the inventor disclosed only a single use for the composition.
Thus, a patent granted on an isolated and purified DNA composition confers the right to exclude
others from any method of us[e] .... " (emphasis omitted)). As Robin Feldman has explained, "Once
the inventor identifies a single use for the product, the inventor may exclude others from the full
spectrum of the product, including any use of the product and other embodiments of the product.
Thus, one embodiment provides an inventor with a broad range of rights." Robin Feldman,
Rethinking Rights in Biospace, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 9 (2005) (footnote omitted).
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Every use includes those not discovered or contemplated at the time of
filing. 150 The broad scope afforded by a composition claim has
considerable practical importance. The research and development
required to make X can be a capital-intensive endeavor that
would provide firms with little incentive to invent without
adequate exclusivity.1 51
2. Modulating Claim Scope
At present, recall that no patent protection is available for
research inputs like X that lack a specific and substantial use at the
time of filing.1 52 The concern is scope: granting the original inventor a
claim on Xwould be too big a reward 5 3 or provide too much control over
downstream activities.15 4 The upstream patent holder could possibly
block research or the commercialization of new uses discovered by
others downstream.155 Michael Risch explains that
[a] blocking patent stops future improvers from [working on or commercializing] an
invention because the underlying technology is patented by someone else. Thus, a patent

150. Thuau, 135 F.2d at 347. For example:
[S]uppose an inventor patents a chemical that is useful for treating an enlarged

prostate.... Subsequently, a different inventor discovers that the chemical helps to
generate hair growth and thus can be used to treat baldness. Even though the first
inventor had no idea that the chemical could be used to treat baldness, her patent on

the chemical itself means any subsequent use of the chemical to treat baldness would
infringe her patent.
Timothy R. Holbrook, Method Patent Exceptionalism, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1001, 1011 (2017).
151. Peter Lee, Contracting to Preserve Open Science: Consideration-BasedRegulation in
Patent Law, 58 EMORY L.J. 889, 906 (2009); cf. Dan L. Burk, Biotechnology in the Federal Circuit:
A Clockwork Lemon, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 441, 451 (2004) ("[I]f there are . .. very expensive
development costs and high innovation costs, we would want to make it easier to get a patent and
easier to get a big patent, as to offer a big reward and big incentive to invest in innovation.").
152. See supra Part I (discussing the utility requirement).
153. Eggert, supra note 25, at 781 ("The first inventor is rewarded for much more than he has
given. He discloses one use, yet is 'paid' for all.").
154. See id. at 781-82 ("[T]he necessity of seeking the first inventor's cooperation can hardly
be an inducement to experimentation or investment by others."); supra notes 78-79 and
accompanying text (discussing the dangers of allowing patents on research inputs); Strandburg,
supra note 78, at 125 ("Patents on research tools ... are 'broad' in the sense that they give the
patent holder exclusive control over the development of the research they facilitate and 'early' in
the sense that they are granted before the research . .. is performed."); BURK & LEMLEY, supra

note 27, at 111 ("Permitting broad upstream patenting of such chemicals might discourage the
downstream research necessary to find a market for those chemicals.").

155. Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 344 (2010). A
downstream researcher who discovers a new use for X can possibly obtain a patent covering that
use. See infra notes 208-209 and accompanying text (distinguishing between composition claims
and method claims). If X is still covered by the original inventor's patent, the earlier patent will
"dominate" the new-use patent until the original inventor's patent expires. Merges & Nelson,

supra note 141, at 861-62. Note that granting the new-use patent does not give the patent holder
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on Chemical X will stop anyone who later discovers a use for Chemical X from [working
on or commercializing] it. This, of course, reduces the incentive for future researchers to
discover a use for Chemical X, leaving the task solely to the original inventor, which may
15 6
be economically inefficient.

The utility requirement prevents this by denying patents on research
inputs because they could mature into blocking patents. 157 And while
all upstream composition patents can block downstream inventors to
some extent, 158 the courts will tolerate blocking and permit upstream
patents if the original inventor can articulate a practical use for X.159
But it is unclear why X should raise greater blocking concerns than
inventions that pass the current utility test. 160 Dmitry Karshtedt
argues that the critical policy concern is not blocking, 161 but rather the
possibility of upstream patents preempting downstream research.1 6 2

One way to allay fears about control over downstream uses is to
modulate claim scope by using the statutory patentability requirements

as "levers."16 3 Utility is ill-suited for this task because it is harshly

the positive right to practice the invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (noting that a patent gives
the patentee a negative right to exclude others from using their invention, not a positive right to
practice it themselves); 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS

§

16.02[1] (2009) ("A patent

basically grants to the patentee . . . the right to exclude others from making, using, and selling the
invention. It does not grant the affirmative right to make, use or sell." (footnote omitted)).
156. Risch, supra note 29, at 1224 (footnotes omitted) (citing Merges & Nelson, supra note 141,
at 860, 870-71).
157. Machin, supra note 11, at 438.
158. Id. at 438-39.
159. Risch, supra note 29, at 1225.
160. For example, consider an inventor who seeks to patent compound X. The inventor can
disclose a trivial use-that X is useful as an air freshener since it has a pleasant odor-to satisfy
§ 101. After the patent issues, it is discovered that Xis a precursor to Z-the first compound known
to effectively treat a rare type of cancer. The owner of the patent on X can control what happens
with Z. See supra note 149 and accompanying text (discussing the broad rights that accompany
composition claims). Nevertheless, the decision of how, whether, or when to license X for cancer
research has nothing to do with the (trivial) utility disclosed (X's fragrant properties) to get the
patent. Put differently, if X had a nontrivial, legally acceptable utility at the time of filing, that
would have no bearing on a subsequent decision to license it for cancer research.
161. "Indeed, the Patent Act expressly contemplates patents for new uses of known things,
even when the known thing is itself patented." Karshtedt, supra note 28, at 984 (citing 35 U.S.C.
§ 100(b)). In discussing Fisher, Karshtedt argues that "[p]atent claims on microscope inventions,
just like claims on chemical inventions, can be complete or incomplete depending on the stage of
the invention's development and that invention's potential to facilitate (and, if patented, to block)
further research and development activity." Id. at 985.
162. Id. at 984. Karshtedt convincingly argues that "[c]ourts do not like patents on upstream
inventions, and, in the absence of a statutory prohibition against the patenting of objects of basic
research, they ... [find ways] to invalidate claims that are drawn to them." Id. at 981 (footnote
omitted); cf. Dan L. Burk, Essay, The Problem of Process in Biotechnology, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 561,
580 (2006) (explaining that "the utility rationale in Fisher" could simply be "a fagade for a policy
judgment about the desirability of 'upstream' patents early in the research process").
163. A policy "lever" is a flexible doctrine that courts use to modulate a uniform patent statute
to achieve certain needs and ends. Dan L. Burk, The Curious Incident of the Supreme Court in
Myriad Genetics, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 505, 535 (2014); Burk & Lemley, supra note 91, at 1675.

2021]

THE RESEARCH PATENT

165

applied (as evinced by the explicit bias against certain inventions). 164
Another possibility is the aforementioned enablement requirement of
§ 112(a). 165 Recall that enablement ensures that a patent "is of an
appropriate scope, in light of the contribution her research makes to the
relevant field."1 66 If the original inventor provides a disclosure that
doesn't enable a PHOSITA to make and use a downstream invention,
then the downstream invention would lie outside the scope of the
upstream patent.1 67
Enablement is a standard that affords the decisionmaker a fair
amount of discretion. 168 Thus, the decisionmaker can set the threshold
for enablement sufficiently high to render any claim covering uses not
explicitly disclosed in the patent invalid.1 69 To illustrate, consider an
inventor who makes the aforementioned chemical compound Y.
Suppose at the time of filing the only known use for Y is treating
arthritis, which is disclosed in the patent. Now suppose a decade later
a subsequent researcher discovers that Yis useful for treating baldness.
The baldness use was neither contemplated by the inventor, disclosed
in the patent application, nor within the PHOSITA's competence at the
time of filing. Although the inventor's composition claim to Y covers all
uses for infringement purposes,1 70 an accused infringer could raise
nonenablement as a defense, arguing that the baldness use was not
enabled as of the patent's filing date. The issue here is what enablement
standard should apply to an "after-arising" technology, which is a
technology that "come[s] into existence after the filing date of a[ ]

164. Sean B. Seymore, Patently Impossible, 64 VAND. L. REv. 1491, 1493 (2011); see also
Karshtedt, supra note 28, at 982 ("[I]t seems counterintuitive that, although the PTO has been
granting patents on silly, ridiculous, and useless inventions without issuing utility rejections, the

utility requirement has been enforced relatively vigorously in the serious and generally useful
fields of chemistry and biotechnology." (footnote omitted)).
165. See supra notes 118-119 and accompanying text (discussing the written description and
enablement requirements).

166. Merges, supra note 105, at 18. Enablement is a legal conclusion based on underlying
factual inquiries. See supra note 114 (listing the Wands factors for enablement analysis).
167. The scope of the claims can be no broader than the scope of enablement provided in the
patent document. In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also supra note 120
(discussing the scope of claims as related to the scope of enablement). Note that enablement of X
is satisfied if the patent document discloses a single mode of using it; meaning that the original
inventor need not enable all uses to obtain a composition claim for X. Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech

Lab'ys, Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1071 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
168. See discussion supra Part I (noting that while a research input itself is unpatentable, it
can serve as prior art).

169. This is because gauging enablement involves a multifactor analysis. See supra note 114
(setting forth the Wands factors).
170. See supra Part II.A (explaining the importance of patent claims).
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[patent] application." 17 1 Until recently, the applicable standard
depended on the technology. The "single embodiment" doctrine applied
to inventions in predictable technologies, 172 meaning that a claim was
enabled as long as the patent's written description taught how to make
and use at least one embodiment. 173 This essentially "place[d] no limit
whatsoever on [claim] scope." 174 In unpredictable fields a "full scope"
enablement requirement applied, meaning that "[c]laims are not
enabled when, at the effective filing date of the patent, [a PHOSITA]
could not practice their full scope without undue experimentation." 175
But this rigid dichotomy has broken down. 176
So it might seem that applying full-scope enablement would
allay the overreaching concerns of the Manson majority. 177 But the story
is not so simple. First, when strictly applied, a full scope enablement
standard requires that the patent "enable every potential embodiment
171. In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 605 (C.C.P.A. 1977); see also Jacob S. Sherkow, Patent Law's
ReproducibilityParadox, 66 DUKE L.J. 845, 867-68 (2017) (exploring the relevance of advances in
science or follow-on research on the enablement determination).
172. For a discussion of the predictable-unpredictable distinction, see supra note 4 and
accompanying text.
173. The patentee is "generally allowed [broad] claims, when the art permits, which cover more
than the specific embodiment shown." In re Vickers, 141 F.2d 522, 525 (C.C.P.A. 1944); id. at 527
("In mechanical cases ... broad claims may be supported by a single form of the apparatus
disclosed in an applicant's application."); see also Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 946 F.2d
1528, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (concluding that enablement is satisfied "if the description enables any
mode of making and using the claimed invention"); Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827
F.2d 1524, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding that a patent need only disclose a single embodiment to
satisfy enablement). An "embodiment" is a concrete, physical form of an invention described in a
patent application or patent. ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW

AND POLICY 33 (7th ed. 2017).
174. Tun-Jen Chiang, Fixing Patent Boundaries, 108 MICH. L. REV. 523, 538 (2010).
175. Wyeth & Cordis Corp. v. Abbott Lab'ys, 720 F.3d 1380, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (emphasis
added) (citing MagSil Corp. v. Hitachi Glob. Storage Techs., Inc., 687 F.3d 1377, 1380-81 (Fed.
Cir. 2012)).
176. See, e.g., Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 1000-03 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(determining that a disclosure enabling video games did not support a broad claim that covered
movies as well as video games); Auto. Techs. Int'l, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 501 F.3d 1274,
1283-85 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (determining that a disclosure enabling mechanical side-impact sensors
was insufficient to support a broad claim encompassing both mechanical and electronic sensors
because the two were "distinctly different"); Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371,
1379-80 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (determining that a disclosure enabling an injector with a pressure jacket
was insufficient to support a claim that covered injectors both with and without a pressure jacket);
AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac & Ugine, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (determining that when
the claims covered a Type 1 or a Type 2 aluminum coating, yet the patent only described a Type 2
coating, the claims were nonenabled because a PHOSITA could not fill in the gaps without
undue experimentation).

177. See Sean B. Seymore, The EnablementPendulum Swings Back, 6 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 278, 284-89 (2008) (describing the emergence of "full scope" enablement as a "lever to
invalidate patents"); cf. James Farrand, Seth Weisberg, Rickard Killworth & Victoria Shapiro,
"Reform"Arrivesin Patent Enforcement: The Big Picture, 51 IDEA 357, 415-17 (2011) (describing
the full scope enablement doctrine and noting that it "can invalidate many existing broad patent
claims, particularly if it continues to be applied as broadly as it is being stated").
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of the invention." 17 8 Returning to the hypothetical, this would compel
the inventor to adequately enable every possible use of Y at the time of
179
and would
filing. This might be impossible for yet-unknown uses
180
Collins
Kevin
Second,
claims.
patent
of
lot
a
invalidate
probably
after-arising
enabling
explains that the case law dealing with
technologies is inconsistent and chaotic:
[C]ourts exercise discretion and oscillate between the full-scope and single-embodiment
doctrines to achieve the desired outcome. When they feel like the inventor has
overreached, they invoke the full-scope doctrine and invalidate the claim. Alternatively,
when they feel that the inventor deserves a right to exclude from the [after-arising
18 1
technology], they employ the single-embodiment rule.
18 2
that
This is not surprising since enablement is a flexible standard
183
outcomes.
inconsistent
and
uncertain
produces
I offer an approach that avoids this problem by introducing a
new form of intellectual property-a researchpatent. It would allow the
inventor to obtain a research claim for X using the following language:
1. Xfor use in research.
Research would include experimentation on X to understand its
characteristics and experimentation with X to facilitate making
something else. 184 So this would encompass both basic and applied

178. Sherkow, supra note 171, at 875 (emphasis added).
179. See Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("[A] patent
document cannot enable technology that arises after the date of application. The law does not
expect an applicant to disclose knowledge invented or developed after the filing date. Such
disclosure would be impossible." (citing In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 605-06 (C.C.P.A. 1977))).
180. Alan L. Durham, Patent Scope and Enablement in Rapidly Developing Arts, 94 N.C. L.
REV. 1101, 1116 (2016); see also Chiang, supra note 174, at 538 (explaining that full-scope
enablement is "an impossible requirement that renders every patent either invalid or completely
worthless"). Bernard Chao has argued that rigid application of the full-scope doctrine might be
inequitable-at least for unforeseen embodiments falling within the scope of the claim. Bernard
Chao, The Infringement Continuum, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1359, 1378 (2014).
181. Kevin Emerson Collins, EnablingAfter-Arising Technology, 34 J. CORP. L. 1083, 1088-89
(2009).
182. See supra note 114 and accompanying text (setting forth the Wands factors).
183. Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of Enablement, 23
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141, 1189-90 (2008); see also Chiang, supra note 174, at 542 (describing
enablement as an "amorphous standard" that leads to great uncertainty).
184. Cf. Andrew S. Baluch, Note, Relating the Two Experimental Uses in Patent Law:
Inventor's Negation and Infringer's Defense, 87 B.U. L. REV. 213, 231 n.134 (2007) (making a
similar distinction); Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 878 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Use of an existing tool in one's research
is quite different from study of the tool itself."). The experimenting on/with distinction for researchrelated inventions has been the subject of judicial and scholarly commentary, often involving
comparisons between chemical compounds and microscopes. CompareIn re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365,
1373 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (explaining that a microscope is useful because it immediately magnifies an
object to reveal its structure but the claimed DNA sequence is not because it cannot provide
information about the overall structure and function of the underlying gene), Ken Burchfiel, Merck
KGaA v. Integra: More Answers Than Questions?, 6 J. HIGH TECH. L. 79, 90 (2006) ("Unlike a
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research. 185 That said, the "for use in research" limitation would

explicitly constrain the scope of the exclusory right. 186
To illustrate, consider a synthetic chemist who invents a new
compound S which is a steroid intermediate. 18 7 Steroids are molecules
built around a characteristic four-ring hydrocarbon skeleton that are
pervasive in nature, vital to human health, and ubiquitous in
pharmacology. 188 Recall that an intermediate is a compound whose
purpose is to serve as a research input for other (downstream)
compounds. 189 A research patent would, for example, permit research
to explore S's chemical properties or functionalization of the skeleton. 190
Research patents would be easy to incorporate into the patent
system. Substantively, the written description of the invention 191 would

be sufficient to satisfy the utility requirement of § 101 and the how-touse prong of the enablement requirement of

§ 112.192 Otherwise, a

microscope, a chemical compound does not have a single, easily-defined utility as a 'research tool.'
A microscope can be used to study diseases, but not to treat them. A chemical compound . . . may
be useful both .. . in laboratory research, and as a therapeutic agent .... "), and Duffy, supra note
30, at 246-47 (arguing that a microscope is useful because "ithas broad applicability to researchers
generally" whereas the DNA sequences in Fisher "ha[d] particular applicability only in research
directed toward understanding the alleged invention itself" and "would be highly likely to produce
blocking patents"), with Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1380 (Rader, J., dissenting) (arguing that microscopes
and claimed DNA sequences both advance research by "tak[ing] a researcher one step closer to
identifying and understanding a previously unknown and invisible structure"), and Karshtedt,
supra note 28, at 985 (criticizing patent law's distinction between these two types of research tools).
185. For the definition of basic research, see supra note 20. Applied research is "[o]riginal
investigation undertaken in order to acquire new knowledge; directed primarily, however, toward
a specific, practical aim or objective." NAT'L CTR. FOR SCI. & ENG'G STAT., NAT'L SCI. FOUND., supra
note 20, at 4-105.
186. Adopting this claim format would likely require overturning the pre-Federal Circuit rule
that statements of purpose in a claim are ignored. See In re Prindle, 297 F.2d 251, 253 (C.C.P.A.
1962) (agreeing with the Patent Board that "intended use expressions cannot serve to patentably
distinguish claims from references which otherwise meet them"); In re Dense, 156 F.2d 76, 77
(C.C.P.A. 1946) ("In article claims, invention must be described in terms of structure and not those
of intended use."). For criticism of the rule and an argument that inventors should be allowed to
add a limitation on how an invention is made or used, see Mark A. Lemley, Without Preamble, 100
B.U. L. REV. 357, 377-84 (2020).
187. Recall that the utility of a chemical intermediate was at issue in the landmark case In re
Nelson, 280 F.2d 172 (C.C.P.A. 1960), discussed supra Part I.
188. See generally JOAN E. STANDORA, ALEX BOGOMOLNIK & MALGORZATA SLUGOCKI,
STEROIDS: HISTORY, SCIENCE, AND ISSUES (2017) (discussing the history, chemistry, and functions

of natural steroids).
189. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing intermediate compounds).
190. This is achieved by adding so-called "functional groups" to the skeleton. A functional
group is "[a]n atom or group of atoms within a molecule that shows a characteristic set of physical
and chemical properties." WILLIAM H. BROWN, BRENT L. IVERSON, ERIC V. ANSLYN & CHRISTOPHER

S. FOOTE, ORGANIC CHEMISTRY, at G-5 (7th ed. 2013). A functional group represents a potential
reaction site in a compound and, thus, determines a compound's chemical reactivity. See generally
RICHARD C. LAROCK, COMPREHENSIVE ORGANIC TRANSFORMATIONS: A GUIDE TO FUNCTIONAL

GROUP PREPARATIONS (2d ed. 1999) (detailing chemical reactions according to functional group).
191. See supra note 118 (discussing the written description requirement).
192. See supra Part I (explaining the utility requirement).
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research patent would be essentially the same as a traditional patent.
Fees and agency procedures would be identical. Thus, research
patents would place little additional administrative burden on the

Patent Office.
B. Enforcing the Research Patent
Like traditional patents, a research patent would give the owner
the statutory right "to exclude others from making, using, offering for
sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or importing
the invention into the United States." 193 Recall that the most likely
inventor of X is an academic researcher who would seek to extract the
full value of the patent through licensing to others. 194 Licensing would
allow the inventor to recoup the costs of X's initial development.
Unlicensed use of X during the patent term would constitute
patent infringement. 195 Patent law generally rejects an experimental
use defense,1 96 although there is a statutory exemption for research on
pharmaceuticals for purposes related to FDA approval. 197 If the owner
of a research patent learns about research activity involving X, the
98
owner may be able to stop the research activity with an injunction.1
193. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1).
194. Cf. Eisenberg, supra note 43, at 1074 ("[T]he patent holder will see research users as
potential customers rather than hostile rivals and will want to extend licenses to them in order to
extract the full value of the patent monopoly.").
195. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a); see also Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 861 (Fed.
Cir. 1984) ("Section 271(a) prohibits, on its face, any and all uses of a patented invention."),
superseded by statute, 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (1994), as recognized in Glaxo, Inc. v. Novopharm, Ltd.,
110 F.3d 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
196. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (denying applicability of
the

"very

narrow

and

strictly

limited"

common-law

experimental

use

exception

to

university researchers).
197. The safe-harbor provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 permits the use of a patented
invention "solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information
under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs .... " 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(1). See Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. 545 U.S. 193, 205-08 (2005)
(interpreting the statute to exempt preclinical use of patented compounds but expressing no
opinion on "research tools"); Proveris Sci. Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc., 536 F.3d 1256, 1265-66
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that research tools not subject to FDA approval do not qualify for the
experimental use exception).

198. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (permitting the grant of injunctive relief in patent cases). But there are
practical reasons why this might not happen. First, infringing activity is hard to detect. See infra
text accompanying notes 203-205 and sources cited therein (discussing the challenges of enforcing
a research patent). Second, "even if the patentee does detect the infringement, it takes time to
bring a lawsuit to completion, and preliminary injunctions are rarely granted in patent cases."

Mark A. Lemley, The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree in IP Law, 103 IOWA L. REV. 245, 256 (2017)
(citing Dennis Crouch, The Impact of eBay on Injunctive Relief in Patent Cases, PATENTLY-O (July
16, 2015), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/07/impact-injunctive-patent.html [https://perma.cc/
74LC-ESYW]). Third, winning a patent infringement suit does not guarantee a permanent
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As for damages, calculations based solely on the infringing research
activity itself are likely to be small. 199 Mark Lemley explains an

alternative approach to damages for infringing research:
[S]ome patentees have sought "reach-through royalties" calculated not based on the actual
infringing use but on the value of the non-infringing downstream product.... The theory
is that because the non-infringing downstream product would not have resulted but for
the infringing research, the patentee's damages should include the value of the non2 00
infringing material that resulted from that research.

Given X's uncertain (downstream) value or utility, 201 the availability of
reach-through royalties could provide a meaningful incentive for
inventors to obtain research patents. The Federal Circuit has suggested
that reach-through damages may be appropriate for infringement
involving research tools. 2 02
Admittedly, enforcement of a research patent would have
practical challenges. There is no easy way to detect X's use in
laboratories hidden from public view. 203 Infringement may never come
to light unless and until the patent owner identifies X in a downstream

injunction. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006) (rejecting the Federal
Circuit's automatic permanent injunction rule for infringement).
199. Lemley, supra note 198, at 256. The patent statute allows a patentee to recover damages
"adequate to compensate for the infringement." 35 U.S.C. § 284. The damages are "usually
measured, depending on the circumstances and the proof, as the patent owner's lost profits or as
a reasonable royalty." Beatrice Foods Co. v. New Eng. Printing & Lithographing Co., 899 F.2d
1171, 1173 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see 35 U.S.C. § 284 (discussing damages as a remedy for infringement).
200. Lemley, supra note 198, at 256 (footnote omitted). For a discussion of how to calculate
reach-through damages for research tools, see James Gregory Cullem, Panningfor Biotechnology
Gold: Reach-Through Royalty Damage Awards for Infringing Uses of Patented Molecular Sieves,
39 IDEA 553, 562-63 (1999); and Janice M. Mueller, No "DilettanteAffair": Rethinking the
Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L.
REV. 1, 58 (2001).
201. Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency of AntitrustAnalysis for PatentMisuse, 55 HASTINGS
L.J. 399, 441 (2003).
202. According to the court,
The value to a licensee of research tools lies, in part, in the point at which those tools
are employed in the drug development continuum. A research tool enabling the
identification of a drug candidate during high throughput screening, for instance, may
supply more value to the ultimate invention than a research tool used to confirm an
already recognized drug candidate's safety or efficacy . . . .Similarly, the amount Merck
would agree to pay for Integra's RGD technology could be influenced by the point of
placement of this technology in its drug development process.
Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 871 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citations omitted),
rev'd on other grounds, 545 U.S. 193 (2005).
203. Katherine J. Strandburg, User Innovator Community Norms: At the Boundary Between

Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 285, 324 (Wesley M. Cohen

&

Academic and Industry Research, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2237, 2257 (2009); see also John P. Walsh,
Ashish Arora & Wesley M. Cohen, Effects of Research Tool Patents and Licensing on Biomedical
Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003) (noting that "infringement of research tool patents is often hard
to detect").
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product or application. 20 4 And even if the patent owner detects an
unlicensed use of X, the owner might acquiesce to infringement if that
use poses no threat to the owner's commercial interests (perhaps by
another academic researcher). 205
C. What Happens When a PracticalUse Is Discovered?
Discovering practical uses for X raises the possibility of
downstream traditional patents. The scope of a downstream patent
would be shaped primarily by patent law's aforementioned novelty
rules. 206 The general novelty rule prohibits issuing a patent that would
"read on" subject matter identically disclosed in the prior art. 207 Since
the (earlier) research patent discloses X, the general rule only permits
patenting of the newly discovered use, not the compound itself. 208 One
commentator has explained that
[i]f an inventor discovers a new, inventive use for a known chemical, he cannot receive a
patent on that compound. He may, however, receive a patent on the use of that
compound . . . . The discoverer of the new use who is restricted to a [method] patent
acquires only the right to preclude others from using the chemical in the exact manner he
20
has disclosed. He acquires no right to produce the compound, to sell it, or even to use it.

9

X's disclosure in the published research patent document is anticipatory
210
prior art that bars a subsequent composition claim to the compound.

204. See Molly A. Holman & Stephen R. Munzer, Intellectual Property Rights in Genes and
Gene Fragments:A Registration Solution for Expressed Sequence Tags, 85 IOWA L. REV. 735, 792
(2000) ("Infringement might remain undetected until . . a product using the EST sequence
becomes available."); cf. Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 2658 (1994) (recognizing that with intellectual property rights, often "there
is no smoky soot or wandering cattle to serve as an unambiguous marker" of infringement).

205. Eisenberg, supra note 43, at 1071-72. Patent owners may engage in this "rational
forbearance" of unlicensed use because "scientific norms still generate social pressure to share
materials, particularly with nonprofit entities." Peter Lee, Note, Patents, ParadigmShifts, and
Progress in Biomedical Science, 114 YALE L.J. 659, 677 (2004).
206. See supra notes 103-105 and accompanying text; 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-102 (laying the
statutory groundwork for patent claims); In re Marshall, 578 F.2d 301, 304 (C.C.P.A. 1978)
(citations omitted) (providing an example of an application of these rules).
207. See supra notes 106 and 113 and accompanying text. If a claim "reads on" a prior art
reference, it is anticipated. Atlas Powder Co. v. IRECO Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
208. See Merck & Co., Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 347 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
("The new use of a known composition is claimed as a method." (emphasis added)).
209. Eggert, supra note 25, at 780-81 (emphasis added). The narrow scope of method claims
makes them harder to enforce and thus less valuable than composition claims. See Holbrook, supra
note 150, at 1010 ("[M]ethods in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries are often viewed as

second-best forms of protection."); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy,
13 MICH. TELECOMMS. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 351 (2007) ("Patents on particular methods of
treatment involving the use of a drug are generally considered less valuable[ ] because they cannot

be used to stop competitors from selling the same product for other uses.").
210. Atlas Powder, 190 F.3d at 1346 (citing Titanium Metals Corp. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775,
781 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
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So the general novelty rule only allows a (method) patent for the newly
discovered use. 21 1
But there is an important exception to the general rule for the
original inventor. Section 102(a)(1) of the patent statute, the basic prior
art rule under the AIA, 2 12 denies patentability if "the claimed invention
was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on
sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date
of the claimed invention." 21 3 This rule treats a pre-filing disclosure,
including activity by the original inventor, as novelty destroying. 214

This means that the disclosure of X in a published research patent
claim. 215
composition
a
subsequent
bar
would
document
Section 102(b)(1)(A), however, is a novelty-preserving exception that

excludes from the prior art "[a] disclosure made 1 year or less before the
effective filing date of a claimed invention ... [if] the disclosure was
made by the inventor ... ."216 Thus, the AIA creates a one-year
statutory grace period for pre-filing disclosures by the originalinventor,
including those in published patent documents. 2 17 So the grace period
would allow the original inventor to obtain a valuable composition
claim 218 to X as long as the subsequent traditional patent application is

filed within a year of the publication of a research patent document. 2 19
This provides a big incentive for the original inventor to find uses
for X.220

211. See supranote 208 and accompanying text.
212. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
213. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1).
214. MUELLER, supra note 12, at 360-62.
215. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
216. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1)(A).
217. See Robert P. Merges, Priorityand Novelty Under the ALA, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1023,
1033 (2012):
[T]he term "disclosure" in AIA § 102(b) ... mean[s] any prior art reference defined
under AIA § 102(a). A disclosure under the AIA, then, means subject matter that is,
prior to an applicant's filing date: "patented, described in a printed publication, or in
public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public," under AIA § 102(a)(1).
218. See supra Part II.
219. This is because the grace period removes the prior disclosure of X from the prior art-as
if it had never been made. Put differently, disclosures made by the original inventor during the
grace period do not enter the public domain (and are thus not prior art). See 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b)(1)(A). That the research patent can act as a placeholder makes it similar to a provisional
patent application, which allows an inventor to obtain an early filing date for the invention before
the inventor is ready to draft a claim or a full application. See id. § 111(b). The inventor must
submit a regular, "nonprovisional" application within one year to get the benefit of the early filing
date. See id. § 111(b)(5).
220. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

A. Justifying Research Patents
The classic rationale for patents is that we grant them to
encourage inventions (and the disclosure of technical information about
them) that the public would not otherwise get. 22 1 Rebecca Eisenberg has
argued that allowing upstream patents on research inputs aligns with
the classic rationale:
[T]he value of a newly invented chemical may derive as much from its usefulness in
facilitating the discovery of other chemicals in future research as from its usefulness in
its present form to non-research consumers. If a patent on the chemical allowed the
inventor to capture the value of the chemical to non-research consumers but not its value
as an input to subsequent research, patent incentives to derive new chemicals would
22 2
be reduced.

Relatedly, Robert Merges has argued that the prospect of getting
a patent and the applicable patentability standard could factor into the
initial decision of whether to pursue the research project in the
first place. 223
Of course, if an inventor would make X anyway, the classic
rationale posits that the law does not need to encourage that work with
a patent.2 2 4 This might be the prevailing story for research patents
because "[t]here are plenty of other incentives for university scientists
to engage in research, including curiosity, academic prestige, and
tenure and promotion." 225 Making a compound that seemed particularly
221. EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE: A
STUDY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 143 (2002); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement

in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 993 (1997) ("Intellectual property is
fundamentally about incentives to invent and create."); Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The
Inducement Standardof Patentability, 120 YALE L.J. 1590, 1597-98 (2011).
222. Eisenberg, supra note 43, at 1074 n.224.
223. Merges, supra note 105, at 11-12.
224. Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 736 (2012); see
also Holman, supra note 16, at 630 ("Critics charge that the incentive effects of research tool

patents are generally modest .... Because research tools are often the product of publicly funded
basic research, it can be argued that most of these technologies would have been discovered and
disclosed to the public with or without the incentive of a patent."); Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C.
Thursby, University Licensing, 23 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL'Y 620, 624 (2007) (explaining that the
justification for university patenting does not come from the incentive to invent because
"universities reward their researchers according to the norms of science").
&

225. Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA

ENT. L.J. 611, 621 (2008); Rai, supra note 35, at 92 (explaining that in academic science, "the
highest levels of recognition and prestige are bestowed upon those who make original contributions
to the common stock of knowledge"). Interestingly, patents and commercialization activities are
becoming relevant for promotion, tenure, and career advancement. See Paul R. Sanberg, Morteza

Gharib, Patrick T. Harker, Eric W. Kaler, Richard B. Marchase, Timothy D. Sands, Nasser Arshadi
& Sudeep Sarkar, Changing the Academic Culture: Valuing Patents and Commercialization
Toward Tenure and CareerAdvancement, 111 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCIS. 6542, 6542-47 (2014).
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challenging or impossible could be an original contribution that bestows

substantial recognition in the scientific community. 226 Aside from that,

some scientists invent molecules for the joy of discovery 227 or the
challenge of solving a puzzle. 228
Research patents, however, better align with other rationales for
patents: (1) disclosure and knowledge transfer and (2) innovation.
1. Disclosure and Knowledge Transfer

Patents and science share the goal of disseminating
knowledge. 229 A research patent would transfer knowledge about X
from the inventor's research laboratory (1) to downstream researchers
who would develop and commercialize it and (2) to the technical
literature, which happens once the patent document publishes. 230 The
former is a formal technology transfer that communicates technical
information about the invention to the licensee. 231 The latter makes the
research patent akin to a technical journal publication. 232
Both types of knowledge transfer depend on the disclosure-the
written description of the invention included in the patent document. 233
The aforementioned enablement requirement would ensure that the

disclosure is adequate to teach a PHOSITA how to make and use X
226. See Rai, supra note 35, at 92 ("The greater the significance of the scientist's original
contribution, the greater the recognition that she receives.").
227. See generally F. A. COTTON, MY LIFE IN THE GOLDEN AGE OF CHEMISTRY: MORE FUN THAN

FUN (2014).
228. PAULA STEPHAN, HOW ECONOMICS SHAPES SCIENCE 5 (2012) (explaining that "enjoyment

derived from the puzzle solving is part of the reward of doing science").
229. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989) (stating that
"the ultimate goal of the patent system is to bring new designs and technologies into the public
domain through disclosure"); J. Jonas Anderson, Nontechnical Disclosure, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1573,
1585 (2016) ("[T]he patent system is designed to bring inventions out into public view."); KELLY
MOORE, DISRUPTING SCIENCE: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, AMERICAN SCIENTISTS, AND THE POLITICS OF
THE MILITARY, 1945-1975, at 2 n.5 (2008) ("Science is considered to be simultaneously a body of
knowledge ... and the means by which knowledge is acquired and disseminated.").
230. The technical information disclosed in the patent document "add[s] to the sum of useful
knowledge" upon publication. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966). Patent documents
include issued patents and published patent applications. Since 1999, most patent applications
publish eighteen months after the earliest effective filing date. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A). Once a
patent application publishes, the information it discloses is considered publicly known. See id.
§ 102 (stating that patent publications serve as prior art against later filed patent).
231. Peter Lee, Transcending the Tacit Dimension:Patents, Relationships,and Organizational
Integration in Technology Transfer, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1503, 1516 (2012).
232. Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 624
n.11 (2010) ("Like technical journals . .. patent [documents] show ... the state of technology, set
forth what others have already achieved, and provide technical information that others can avoid
repeating.").
233. See supra note 118; Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 922 n.5 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) ("[T]he role of the specification is to teach, both what the invention is (written
description) and how to make and use it (enablement).").
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without undue experimentation. 2 3 4 As Dan Burk and Mark Lemley
have explained, "the underlying assumption in patent law is that the
inventor 'has' the invention mentally, and so can give a sufficiently
detailed description of that inventive conception-[thus] physically
creating the invention is straightforward." 2 35 So a robust disclosure
makes patents more useful for follow-on innovation. 236
Yet, the current (harsh) utility standard for research inputs like
X can hinder disclosure. 23 7 It creates an incentive for inventors to keep
X secret while a legally acceptable (practical) use is sought. 238 As
Jeanne Fromer has explained, "Until the inventor is closer to knowing
whether the invention will receive patent protection, the inventor will
typically not want to jeopardize the secrecy-and thus competitive
profitability-of the invention." 239
If disclosure is the "centerpiece of patent policy," 240 then secrecy
is its antithesis. 24 1 No disclosure means that knowledge about X may
never become public. 2 4 2 So the inventor's choice between secrecy and
disclosure can have far-reaching effects:

234. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
235. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1155, 1174 n.77 (2002).
236. Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 131 (2006); see also
Kevin Emerson Collins, The StructuralImplicationsof Inventors'DisclosureObligations,69 VAND.
L. REV. 1785, 1790-91 (2016) (discussing the public-knowledge theory of disclosure and its
grounding in social benefit). For example, a robust disclosure reduces research-and-development
waste. Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinningsof Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247, 267
n.79 (1994). In licensing, a weak disclosure leads to incomplete technology transfer and thus delays
innovation. See Lee, supra note 231, at 1516-18.
237. See Machin, supra note 11, at 440; Phanesh Koneru, To Promote the Progress of Useful
Articles?: An Analysis of the Current Utility Standards of Pharmaceutical Products and
Biotechnological Research Tools, 38 IDEA 625, 670 (1998) ("Manson ... reflects a fundamental
misunderstanding of the policy of promoting the progress in useful arts. Its focus on promoting
useful articles, to the exclusion of the technical merits of the invention, is shortsighted.").
238. Anderson & Dyson, supranote 81, at 817; cf. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 538 (1966)
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (recognizing that an inventor may make the

"abstractly logical choice . . to maintain secrecy until a product use can be discovered").
239. Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 555 (2009).
240. Note, The DisclosureFunction of the Patent System (or Lack Thereof), 118 H-ARV. L. REV.
2007, 2011 (2005).
241. J. Jonas Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 917, 919 (2011).
242. As the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals observed:
The man who secretes his invention makes easier and plainer the path of no one. He

contributes nothing to the public. Over and over it has been repeated that the object of
the patent system is through protection to stimulate invention, and inventors ought to

understand that this is for the public good. Where an invention is made and hidden
away it might as well never have been made at all, at least so far as the public
is concerned.

Horwath v. Lee, 564 F.2d 948, 950 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
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Innovators who have a choice between ... secrecy and patent protection for, say, a
chemical discovery will thereby be making a choice between inaccessible and accessible
information. Subsequent researchers may rediscover the same compound or process, and
competitors may eventually reverse engineer the secret, but the issuance of a patent will
disclose what that innovation is, how to make it, how it differs from the prior art, [etc.].
This knowledge will thereby become publicly accessible sooner and with less reduplication
of effort than the . . . secret option would produce.

243

This is why the patent system encourages early public disclosure
of inventions.244

Nevertheless, concerns about secrecy are often downplayed
because it is assumed that the inventions emerging from academic
research will be inevitably disclosed-perhaps in a peer-reviewed
technical journal. 245 This is an empirical proposition that is hard to
confirm. 246 One cannot, however, automatically assume that X will be
published in a journal. 247 A considerable amount of basic research
results in academic science falls into oblivion. 248
Where do research patents fit in? First, a research patent would
permit the inventor of X to disclose it (publicly or privately) without
losing exclusive rights. 2 4 9 Using Xwithout permission during the patent

243. Pamela Samuelson, Lecture, Enriching Discourseon Public Domains, 55 DUKE L.J. 783,
829 (2006); see also Martin J. Adelman, Property Rights Theory and Patent-Antitrust:The Role of
Compulsory Licensing, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 977, 982 (1977) (explaining that one of the costs of secrecy
is "reinvention, which from society's viewpoint is a waste of money, time, and talent"); Eisenberg,
supra note 43, at 1028 (secrecy increases the likelihood of duplicative efforts of others who have
no knowledge of the inventor's contribution).
244. "Early public disclosure is a linchpin of the patent system." W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., v.
Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 606
(C.C.P.A. 1977) (explaining that patentability standards should be interpreted to promote
"prompt, early disclosure"); Kitch, supra note 41, at 269-71 (discussing the patent system's
emphasis on early disclosure and the rules and policies that promote it).
245. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (downplaying the issue of secrecy because "if
the inventor of a process cannot himself ascertain a 'use' . . .he has every incentive to make his
invention known to those able to do so").
246. It is impossible to find out how many inventors opt out of the patent system because of
utility hurdles. Machin, supra note 11, at 440 ("The scope of this problem will be difficult to
determine because these inventions will suffer anonymous deaths.").
247. See Ajay Agrawal & Rebecca Henderson, Putting Patents in Context: Exploring
Knowledge Transfer from MIT, 48 MGMT. SCI. 44, 58 (2002) (explaining that faculty researchers
decide whether to publish and/or patent on a case-by-case basis).
248. Nonpublication occurs because of time constraints, flaws in the research design, fear that
the project will not be accepted by a high-impact journal, a perception that more data is needed
before submission, and a researcher not wanting competitors to know the seemingly fruitless paths
that the researcher has been exploring. See Jonathan Knight, Null and Void, 422 NATURE 554,
554-55 (2003); Donald Kennedy, Editorial, The Old File-DrawerProblem, 305 SCIENCE 451, 451
(2004); STUART FIRESTEIN, FAILURE: WHY SCIENCE IS SO SUCCESSFUL 41 (2015).
249. See Kitch, supra note 41, at 277-79 (discussing how patents, as opposed to trade secrets,
allow companies to efficiently disclose their inventions in the pursuit of commercialization). Of
course, the inventor is subject to patent law's novelty requirement. Once disclosed, the inventor
has one year to file a (research) patent application. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1), (b)(1)(A); Helsinn
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term would allow the patent owner to sue for infringement. 250 Second,
research patents would promote the patent system's goal of early
disclosure 25 1 by allowing inventors of research inputs to obtain patent
protection before a practical use is discovered. 25 2 Third, obtaining a
research patent would facilitate disclosure beyond the patent systema knowledge spillover. Timothy Holbrook has explained that "[a]n
inventor who anticipates obtaining a patent on an invention will be
more willing to publish a scientific article or other sort of disclosure to
the public, because she knows her invention will eventually be
2 53
protected by a patent."
2. Innovation
Innovation is the development and commercialization of an
invention after its creation. 254 Innovation is generally made outside of
academia by private firms. 25 5 This makes sense: academic scientists
doing basic research tend to focus on pure scientific discovery and
building fundamental knowledge rather than developing practical
applications. 25 6 A patent provides the necessary incentive for firms to
Healthcare, S.A. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 628, 633-34 (2019) (reaffirming pre-AIA
precedent that secret commercialization efforts by the inventor can serve as novelty-defeating
prior art).

250. See supra Part II.
251. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
252. Publication of the patent document will provide society with the requisite knowledge to
find practical uses for X. Cf. Koneru, supra note 237, at 646-47 ("[W]ith respect to a product patent,
making a product is the invention, and that once the society knows how to make a product, it can

eventually discover the highest and best use for that product.").
253. Holbrook, supra note 236, at 146 (emphasis added); Pierre Azoulay, Waverly Ding & Toby
Stuart, The Impact of Academic Patentingon the Rate, Quality and Directionof (Public) Research
Output, 57 J. INDUS. ECON. 637, 669-70 (2009) (providing empirical research showing that
academic scientists engage in a "flurry" of publication activity around the time of filing a
patent application).
254. Lemley, supra note 225, at 624 (citing Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post
Justificationsfor Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 147 (2004)); see also F. Scott Kieff,
Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 753
(2001) (arguing that the patent system exists "in which a central goal is to facilitate
commercialization of new goods and services"); Michael Abramowicz, The Danger of
Underdeveloped Patent Prospects, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1065, 1067 (2007) (explaining the
importance of commercialization in fully developing the patent right). "Innovation is the multistage process whereby organizations transform ideas into new/improved products, service or

processes, in order to advance, compete and differentiate themselves successfully in their
marketplace." Anahita Baregheh, Jennifer Rowley & Sally Sambrook, Towards a
MultidisciplinaryDefinition of Innovation, 47 MGMT. DECISIONS 1323, 1334 (2009).
255. Thursby & Thursby, supra note 224, at 624.
256. Agrawal & Henderson, supranote 247, at 58; Robert E. Litan, Lesa Mitchell & E.J. Reedy,
Commercializing University Innovations: Alternative Approaches, 8 INNOVATION POL'Y & ECON.
31, 32 (2007). The story is different in engineering and the applied sciences, where much university
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invest in the often costly and risky development required to transform
the nascent technology into a downstream application. 25 7
It is also true that patents were long frowned upon in academic
science. 25 8 University researchers viewed them as antithetical to
traditional scientific norms of open sharing, discourse, and serving the
public good. 25 9 These views have evolved for a variety of reasons-

including a decline in federal support for basic research 26 0 and passage
of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, which allows universities to patent and
license inventions arising from federally funded research. 26 1 Now, every
major research university has a technology transfer office tasked with
collecting invention disclosures of early-stage research, obtaining

patents, and licensing them to private firms for commercialization. 26 2
Consistent with this alternative rationale for patents, BayhDole's purpose is not to incentivize invention. 26 3 Rather, it seeks to
research gives attention to practical objectives. See David C. Mowery, Richard R. Nelson, Bhaven
N. Sampat & Arvids A. Ziedonis, The Growth of Patentingand Licensing by U.S. Universities:An
Assessment of the Effects of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 30 RSCH. POL'Y 99, 101 (2001) ("Many
important advances in applications have emerged from academic research ... on the engineering
and applied sciences.").
257. Thursby & Thursby, supra note 224, at 624; Holman, supra note 16, at 630.
258. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, ProprietaryRights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology
Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 181-84 (1987).
259. Lee, supra note 31, at 19; see also Rai, supranote 35, at 90 (explaining that in light of the
strong norm in science that "scientific knowledge is ultimately a shared resource" for the public
domain, "claiming property rights in invention is often seen as immoral"); Robert P. Merges,
Property Rights Theory and the Commons: The Case of Scientific Research, 13 SoC. PHIL. & POL'Y
145, 145 (1996) ("[C]ommercializing the heretofore noble, pure, and otherwise untainted field of
science is not just poor policy, but intrinsically bad." (emphasis omitted)). This way of thinking has
gained even more popularity in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, the Association
of University Transfer Managers ("AUTM"), the world's leading association of technology transfer
professionals, has encouraged IP owners to adopt a COVID-19 licensing strategy that calls for
"adopting time-limited, non-exclusive royalty-free licenses, in exchange for the licensees'
commitment to rapidly make and broadly distribute products and services to prevent, diagnose,
treat and contain COVID-19." COVID-19 Licensing Guidelines, AUTM, https://autm.net/abouttech-transfer/covidl9/covid-19-licensing-guidelines (last visited Oct. 11, 2020) [https://perma.cc/
Y4AG-N7J5]. Academic signatories include Caltech, Cornell, Duke, Georgetown, Harvard, Johns
Hopkins, MIT, Princeton, Stanford, Vanderbilt, and Yale. Id.
260. Bhaven N. Sampat, Patenting and U.S. Academic Research in the 20th Century: The
World Before and After Bayh-Dole, 35 RSCH. POL'Y 772, 776 (2006); see also Jeffrey Mervis, Data
Check: FederalShare of Basic Research Hits New Low, 355 SCIENCE 1005, 1005 (2017) ("Data from
ongoing surveys by the National Science Foundation (NSF) show that federal agencies provided
only 44% of the $86 billion spent on basic research in 2015.").
261. Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.
§§ 200-211).
262. Lee, supra note 231, at 1514; Valerie Landrio McDevitt, Joelle Mendez-Hinds, David
Winwood, Vinit Nijhawan, Todd Sherer, John F. Ritter & Paul R. Sandberg, More Than Money:
The Exponential Impact of Academic Technology Transfer, 16 TECH. & INNOVATION 75, 7584 (2014).
263. Rai, supra note 35, at 97 ("Bayh-Dole was not particularly concerned about invention in
itself."); Thursby & Thursby, supra note 224, at 624 (explaining that Bayh-Dole focuses on ex post
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is, to promote
stimulate innovation beyond invention-that
downstream application of university research results. 264 Returning to
X, there's a real likelihood that it could languish as an undeveloped or
26 6
dead-end project, 265 which is the fate of a lot of basic research.
267
a research patent would open
Aside from promoting disclosure,
and
commercialization
door to monetizing X through
the
268
reach-through royalties.
B. ControllingFuture Uses
The principal rationale for denying patents on research inputs
like X is that such patents give the inventor too much control over the
unknown. 26 9 This includes "the ability to block technological progress
by controlling the research that may be performed using the [input].1"270
Relatedly, a patent on X could "creat[e] an 'anticommons' in which
rights holders may impose excessive transaction costs or make the
acquisition of licenses and other rights too burdensome to permit the
271
pursuit of scientifically and socially worthwhile research."
The anticommons hypothesis has received considerable
scholarly attention. When Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg

incentives); see also MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY

228 (2008) (explaining that the quality and quantity of federally sponsored research has "remained
roughly where it was [before passage of Bayh-Dole], meaning that patentability made no difference
as far as general incentives are concerned").
264. WENDY H. SCHACHT, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL32076, THE BAYH-DOLE ACT: SELECTED
ISSUES IN PATENT POLICY AND THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF TECHNOLOGY 8 (2012). The stated

policy objective of Bayh-Dole is "to use the patent system to promote the utilization of inventions
arising from federally supported research or development." 35 U.S.C. § 200.
265. Lemley, supra note 225, at 621; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private
Development: Patentsand Technology Transfer in Government-SponsoredResearch, 82 VA. L. REV.
1663, 1664 (1996).
266. See supra note 248. Nonpublication is a bigger concern with industrial scientists. See
generally Benoit Godin, Research and the Practiceof Publicationin Industries, 25 RSCH. POL'Y 587,
587 (1996). The highest priority for an industrial inventor is to generate results that show
commercial promise. Diana Hicks, Published Papers, Tacit Competencies and Corporate
Management of the Public/PrivateCharacterof Knowledge, 4 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 401, 41314 (1995).
267. See infra Part III.
268. See supra Part II.
269. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.

&

270. Strandburg, supra note 78, at 123. For a general theoretical discussion, see Merges
Nelson, supra note 141, at 842-44, 894-908 (discussing how upstream patents can retard
downstream

innovation); and Suzanne

Scotchmer,

Standing on the Shoulders of Giants:

Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSPS. 29, 30-32 (1991) (same). These
concerns are not present for upstream inventions in predictable fields. See Collins, supra note 9,

at 1621 n.79.
271. John P. Walsh, Charlene Cho & Wesley M. Cohen, View from the Bench: Patents and
Material Transfers, 309 SCIENCE 2002, 2002 (2005).
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published it in 1998,272 they argued that an anticommons would impose
significant costs in biotechnology-a field where progress depends on

the accessibility of (upstream) research inputs like proteins and DNA
fragments. 273 But empirical research fails to show that the patenting of
research inputs in biotechnology has adversely affected innovation. 274
The research includes studies of thousands of biotechnology patents 2 75
and surveys of attorneys, scientists, and technology managers about the
impact of patents on their work.276 There is "no evidence of academics
being excluded from research due to patents on research
inputs ... [and] virtually no instances of industrial or academic
researchers being stopped due to an inability to gain access to a large
number of patents needed for a research project." 277 A survey of the
international research community by the American Association for the
Advancement of Science reached the same conclusion. 278 Some
commentators argue that patents on research tools actually promote
research and development ("R&D") by "supporting an active market for
technology." 279 Other commentators argue that an anticommons

272. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698-99 (1998).
273. Id. at 699; Richard Li-dar Wang, Biomedical Upstream Patentingand Scientific Research:
The Case for Compulsory Licenses Bearing Reach-Through Royalties, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 251,
261 (2008).
274. David E. Adelman, A Fallacy of the Commons in Biotech Patent Policy, 20 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 985, 1029 (2005).
275. See, e.g., David E. Adelman & Kathryn L. DeAngelis, PatentMetrics: The Mismeasure of
Innovation in the Biotech Patent Debate, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1677, 1680 (2007) (finding, based on
dataset of fifty-two thousand biotechnology patents from January 1990 through December 2004,
that there is "little evidence that the recent growth in biotechnology patenting is
threatening innovation').
276. See John P. Walsh, Wesley M. Cohen & Charlene Cho, Where Excludability Matters:
Material Versus Intellectual Property in Academic Biomedical Research, 36 RSCH. POL'Y 1184,
1185-86 (2007) (reporting on a survey of 507 academic biomedical researchers); Walsh et al., supra
note 271, at 2002-03 (reporting the findings from a survey of 414 biotech researchers in academia,
government, and nonprofit institutions); Walsh et al., supra note 203, at 285 (reporting the
findings from a survey of seventy respondents which included intellectual property attorneys,
scientists, and managers from biotech firms, pharmaceutical firms, and universities).
277. Wesley M. Cohen & John P. Walsh, Access-or Not-in Academic Biomedical Research,
in WORKING WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 1, 15 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss,

Diane L. Zimmerman & Harry First eds., 2010) (footnotes omitted); see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Noncompliance, Nonenforcement, Nonproblem? Rethinking the Anticommons in Biomedical
Research, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1059, 1098 (2008) ("Survey results from scientists suggest that,
although commercial scientists face more obstacles from intellectual property than academic
scientists, in both settings it is rare for an ongoing project to be stopped because of patents.").
278. The survey results "offer very little evidence of an 'anticommons problem.' " AM. ASS'N
FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY EXPERIENCES: A
REPORT OF FOUR COUNTRIES 12 (2007). The survey results "also suggest that IP-protected

technologies remain relatively accessible to the broad scientific community, and not as constrained
by IP protections as many have cautioned." Id. at 15.
279. Walsh et al., supra note 203, at 280.
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objection is weak because the owner of a patent on a research input has
no incentive to block downstream research. 280
Patent scholars offer a host of reasons why an anticommons is
not observed in academic science. First, it is widely believed that
university researchers simply ignore patents. 28 1 Second (and
contrariwise), some university researchers will negotiate a license to
gain access to a patented technology. 2 82 Third, patent owners acquiesce
to infringement by university researchers because of the high costs of
detecting it, the low value of a potential lawsuit, and the social pressure
to share with nonprofits. 283 Fourth, a researcher can invent around the
patented technology. 284 And fifth, a potential infringer may opt to
challenge the patent. 285
The bottom line is that fears of the unknown are greatly
overblown. 286 This has led to a rethinking of the anticommons
hypothesis and its role in shaping patent policy. 28 7

280. See, e.g., Duffy, supra note 30, at 242 ("Because the holder of an embryonic patent needs
to have the patent developed by further research, the right holder has every incentive to try to
lower the costs of that research. A patent holder gains nothing by blocking research needed to
bring the innovation to market.").

281. Strandburg, supra note 203, at 2250 (describing the "norm of ignoring patents" among
scientists); Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 21 (same).
282. See Lori Pressman, Richard Burgess, Robert M. Cook-Deegan, Stephen J. McCormack, Jo
Nami-Wolk, Melissa Soucy & LeRoy Walters, The Licensing of DNA Patents by US Academic
Institutions:An Empirical Survey, 24 NATURE BIOTECH. 31, 31-39 (2006).
283. See supra notes 203-204 and accompanying text; Eisenberg, supranote 277, at 1062; Lee,
supra note 205, at 677.
284. If X is patented, another researcher might make (a new) analogous compound X' to avoid
infringement. Inventing around a patented technology is an activity that the patent system
encourages. London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991); State Indus.,
Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1235-36 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
285. Wesley M. Cohen & John P. Walsh, Real Impediments to Academic Biomedical Research,
8 INNOVATION POL'Y & EcoN. 1, 12 (2007).
286. John Duffy argues that the Manson Court's fears are unrealistic:
[Ilit is simply not true that granting one early patent to a whole field of new technology
"shuts the door" to future inventions .... It is true that [the patent holder] could try to
block off whole areas of research, but the patent holder has every economic incentive
not to do so. The patent on the basic technology will have value only if further R&D
is completed.
Duffy, supra note 30, at 241; see also Lawrence R. Velvel, A Critique of Brenner vs. Manson, 49 J.
PAT. OFF. SoC'Y 5, 10 (1967) (arguing that the ability to obtain patents on newly discovered uses
would prevent the owner of a composition patent from blocking off an entire field of research).

287. See sources cited supra note 277.
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C. Giving Research Its Due in Patent Law
Patent law is very much about research. The archetypal inventor
is a scientist working in a research laboratory. 288 But even a sole
inventor working in a garage to build a better mousetrap can be deemed
a researcher. 289 Inventions that come about by accident-thus not the
object of research-nevertheless often occur in research settings. 290
So what explains the hostility toward granting patents on
research inputs like X? To answer this question, it is necessary to look

at technology specificity in patent law. In theory, patent law functions
as a unitary system in that all inventions-regardless of technical
field-must satisfy the same statutory patentability criteria. 29 1 But the
technology-neutral nature of the patent statutes gives courts discretion
to tailor patentability standards flexibly across technologies or
industries. 292 Sometimes this must be done to adjust patent doctrines
and accommodate new types of inventions as technology evolves. 293

Technology specificity finds support in patent law, particularly
when it is done for the sake of innovation. 2 94 For example, long ago the
courts favored extraordinary technological advances by rewarding the
owners of patents of these inventions "with exceptionally broad claim
scope in exchange for their outsized technological contribution to

society." 295 As Brian Love has described, this special treatment, "which
helped inventors like Edison, Bell, and Marconi turn their inventions
into the technological giants we know today as General Electric, AT&T,
and RCA, has over time influenced many aspects of patent law, not to
mention the very history of innovation." 296 Society really cared about

288. See generally MICHAEL E. GORMAN, TRANSFORMING NATURE: ETHICS, INVENTION AND

DISCOVERY 69 (1998) (examining the processes of invention and discovery and how they are
carried out).

289. This type of activity is "applied" research. See supra note 185.
290. Sean B. Seymore, Serendipity, 88 N.C. L. REV. 185, 188-90 (2009); Sean B. Seymore,
Atypical Inventions, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2057, 2063-66 (2011).
291. See supra note 26. As a signatory to a multilateral intellectual property agreement, the
United States agrees that patent rights shall be "enjoyable without discrimination as to ... the
field of technology" subject only to a few enumerated exceptions. Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 27(1), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND vol. 33, 33 I.L.M. 81, 93-94 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
292. Burk & Lemley, supra note 91, at 1576-77; Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, supra note
235, at 1156.
293. In theory, this allows the patent system "to adapt flexibly to both old and new
technologies, encompassing 'anything under the sun that is made by man.' " Burk & Lemley, supra

note 91,
294.
295.
296.

at 1576 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)).
BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 27, at 95.
Brian J. Love, Interring the PioneerInvention Doctrine, 90 N.C. L. REV. 379, 382 (2012).
Id. (footnote omitted).
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these inventions because they brought radical benefits to everyday
life. 297 Nowadays, the Patent Office and the courts may simply want to
298
incentivize invention in certain fields over others.
Plenty of research inputs have created benefits to everyday life
and changed the world, 299 so again it is curious why they are subject to
a clear but harsh utility standard. Recall that there is a fear that
upstream patents on these research inputs are more likely to impede
downstream innovation than those covering inventions with a known
practical use. 30 0 Scott Kieff strongly disagrees with this notion:
It cannot be, however, that patents on inputs generally prevent the production of outputs.
Entire industries have come and gone using scores of patented inputs. Every car is made

using countless patented parts, fasteners, processes, and subsystems. Even the biological
scientist manages to use a variety of patented machines, reagents, and equipment in the

ordinary course of research. It does not appear that [critics] would argue that producers
of biological innovations should not have to pay the licensing fee for ordinary inputs,
including, for example, the intermittent windshield wiper subsystems on the car they
30 1
drive to the laboratory in the morning.

History reveals that predictions about the ill effects of patenting
can be wrong. Consider Diamond v. Chakrabarty,the landmark 1980
case where the Supreme Court had to determine whether a genetically
engineered bacterium is patent-eligible. 302 The Patent Office and
several amici argued against eligibility because patenting genetic
research would lead to a "parade of horribles" that could "pose a serious
threat to the human race," including "[the] spread [of] pollution and
[a] practice [that] may
disease,... a loss of genetic diversity, and ...
303
The ChakrabartyCourt
tend to depreciate the value of human life."
declined the invitation to bring fear of the unknown into the
patentability calculus: "Whether respondent's claims are patentable
may determine whether research efforts are accelerated by the hope of

297. Id. at 382 n.3; cf. John R. Thomas, The Question Concerning Patent Law and Pioneer
Inventions, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 35, 37 (1995) ("[P]ioneer inventions are crucial to the sort of
technological advance that the patent system is designed to encourage. They are the inventions
with which we are most familiar, and those we care most about." (footnotes omitted)).

298. See Risch, supra note 29, at 1221 (exploring arguments that the bias may stem from a
"simpl[e]

desire

to incentivize

manufacturing instead of science").

This could run

afoul

of the technology nondiscrimination rule in the TRIPS Agreement. See supra note 291 and
accompanying text.
299. See, e.g., K.C. NICOLAOU & TAMSYN MONTAGNON, MOLECULES THAT CHANGED THE WORLD
(2008); JAMES WEI, GREAT INVENTIONS THAT CHANGED THE WORLD (2012); IRWIN W. SHERMAN,
DRUGS THAT CHANGED THE WORLD: HOw THERAPEUTIC AGENTS SHAPED OUR LIVES (2016).
300. See supra note 154 and accompanying text; cf. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Lab'ys., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012) ("And monopolization of those tools through the grant of a
patent might tend to impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it.").
301. Kieff, supra note 254, at 720.
302. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
303. Id. at 316.
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reward or slowed by want of incentives, but that is all." 304 The fears

were not realized; indeed, Chakrabarty spawned the then-nascent
biotechnology industry by making the fruits of research
patent-eligible. 305
The other possibility relates to the unpredictable nature of fields

like chemistry.3 06 Once made,

a chemical

compound's practical

usefulness often cannot be ascertained without additional research. 307
Also, most laypersons (and judges) have some familiarity with
predictable technologies like paper clips, but not so much with

chemistry. 308 Judge Learned Hand lamented this problem when
he struggled

with

chemistry in addressing

the patentability

of

purified adrenaline:
I cannot stop without calling attention to the extraordinary condition of the law which
makes it possible for a man without any knowledge of even the rudiments of chemistry to
pass upon such questions as these. The inordinate expense of time is the least of

the resulting evils, for only a trained chemist is really capable of passing upon
such facts . ...

309

So the harsh treatment might stem from a tendency to fear things that
cannot be seen, let alone understood.3 1 0 This is related to the tendency
of decisionmakers to be risk averse because they overweigh the
likelihood of bad outcomes. 31 1
304. Id. at 317.
305. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 173, at 98; see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Story
of Diamond v. Chakrabarty, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 356-57 (Jane C. Ginsburg

& Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006) (stating that Chakrabarty "was a watershed
moment ... for the biotechnology industry ... [and] investment in biotechnology R&D has
flourished in [its] wake").
306. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
307. See sources cited supranotes 4-14.
308. The broader point is that a court hearing a patent case may not "fully understand all of
the science it encounters." Burk & Lemley, supra note 292, at 1197; see also Arti Rai, Addressing
the Patent Gold Rush: The Role of Deference to PTO Patent Denials, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POLY 199,
213 (2000) (discussing scenarios where the Federal Circuit erroneously applied the patent statute
because it "misapprehend[ed] the relevant technology"). For an example of a court explicitly noting
its lack of knowledge of the underlying science in a patent case, see In re Perrigo, 48 F.2d 965, 966
(C.C.P.A. 1931).
309. Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 115 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 196 F. 496 (2d. Cir. 1912).
310. Cf. Seymore, supra note 93, at 1128 (arguing that patent law has a "problem of scale,"
which "is in accord with the tendency of people to fear things that they cannot see, let alone
understand"). This can be traced to the Latin proverb "[d]amnant quod non intellegunt," which
literally means "[t]hey condemn what they do not understand." WALDO E. SWEET, LATIN
PROVERBS: WISDOM FROM ANCIENT TO MODERN TIMES 87 (Georgia Irby-Massie & Scott Van Horn

eds., 2002).
311. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCH. 341,
343-45 (1984) (describing the cognitive phenomenon); see also Christine Jolls, Behavioral
Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653, 1659-61 (1998)
(describing over-pessimism); cf. W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS 104 (1992) (suggesting that
people overestimate low probability risks).
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Sometimes technology-specific rules do more harm than good by
jeopardizing the progress they seek to promote. 312 For research inputs,
the harsh utility requirement can lead to secrecy or delayed entry into
the patent system unless and until a legally acceptable (practical) use
is discovered. 3 13 Granting research patents would avoid all these
problems and give research its due in the U.S. patent system.
CONCLUSION
If the utility requirement is to do legitimate work in patent
law, 314 it should be construed and applied to promote the greatest
amount of scientific progress. 3 15 But the harsh standard currently
applied to research inputs in unpredictable technologies does just the
opposite. It is somewhat ironic that the unpredictable nature of these
inventions-the attribute that fuels research, creates new possibilities,
leads to paradigm shifts, and does other things that the patent system
seeks to promote-is responsible for the hypothesized (and unrealized)

312. Wagner, supra note 46, at 1344 ("[N]ot all technological exceptionalism is benign. When
the jurisprudential approach shifts from adaptation to prescription-from the application of
consistent

rules ...

to the promulgation

of distinct

rules to

implement

technology-based

innovation policy-courts put at risk the very social progress they seek to enhance.").
313. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 538-39 (1966) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); see also Machin, supra note 11, at 439-40 (arguing that the current utility
doctrine "comes at no small price," including fostering secrecy which, in turn, is detrimental to
technological progress); Julian David Forman, A Timing Perspectiveon the Utility Requirement in
Biotechnology Patent Applications, 12 ALB. L.J. ScI. & TECH. 647, 669 (2002) (arguing that a
heightened utility standard could hinder technological progress by delaying patent protection until
later stages of R&D, thereby resulting in less investment in high-risk projects).
314. "The only exceptions to the effective elimination of the utility requirement in patent law
are in the fields of biology and chemistry." BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 27, at 111. One
commentator makes a normative argument for the work that utility should do:

For the utility doctrine to be a vital component of patent law, it must impose at least
minimal requirements on an invention. It must divide the world of inventions into

"patentable" and "non-patentable" categories in a way that is different than the division
imposed by the other requirements for patentability. In addition, the utility doctrine
must further the patent system's goals consistent with the system's policies.

Machin, supra note 11, at 425 (footnote omitted); cf. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Lab'ys., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 90 (2012) (explaining that a particular statutory patentability
requirement may be equipped to do work that others cannot). Patent scholars differ on the

helpfulness of the utility requirement. Compare Risch, supra note 10, at 58 ("Usefulness can
be . . . surprisingly helpful in patent law and policy . . . . [U]sefulness is not only relevant to
patentability, but also critical to it.... The doctrine is especially helpful at the margins, where
courts consider policy in deciding close cases; usefulness can often put a thumb on the scale."), with

Sean B. Seymore, Making Patents Useful, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1046, 1073-77 (2014) (arguing that
subjectivity, indifference to the technical substance of the disclosure, and superfluity make the
utility requirement "substantively bankrupt").

315. Machin, supra note 11, at 439.
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fears about blocking access to knowledge and impairing downstream
uses that underlie the harsh standard.
This Article seeks to rectify this problem by proposing a research
patent regime. This proposal would allow inventors to obtain patents

on early-stage, basic research and extract their full value through
licensing and enforcement. The limited scope of protection offered by
research patents would allay concerns about overbreadth and control.
The ultimate goal of research patents is to promote the disclosure,
development, and use of research inputs-which all align with the
patent system's basic goal to protect and promote advances in science
and technology. Research patents also present an opportunity to
recalibrate the role of utility in the patentability calculus and give

research its due in the patent system.

